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Bargaining Around Bankruptcy:
Small Business Workouts and State Law
Edward R. Morrison∗

Abstract
In the United States, few failing businesses invoke the Bankruptcy Code to reorganize or
liquidate. Most use non‐bankruptcy procedures to accomplish the same purposes. These
procedures include voluntary agreements between the debtor and its creditors (“work‐
outs”) and formal devices such as friendly foreclosures, bulk sales, and assignments for
the benefit of creditors. This paper documents the importance of non‐bankruptcy proce‐
dures using firm‐level data from Cook County, Illinois. I find that these procedures are
used by 80 percent of distressed small businesses. The paper also identifies the condi‐
tions under which a business chooses federal bankruptcy law over non‐bankruptcy pro‐
cedures. I model this choice—theoretically and empirically—as the outcome of bargain‐
ing game between the debtor’s owner and its senior lenders. The parties are more likely
to consent to non‐bankruptcy procedures when bargaining costs are low and when the
debtor has maintained a close relationship with senior lenders, who trust the informa‐
tion provided by the owner. When the number of senior lenders is relatively large (rais‐
ing bargaining costs) or when the debtor has defaulted on senior debt (thereby harming
its relationship with lenders), senior lenders are more likely to push for a federal bank‐
ruptcy filing. Owners may also prefer a federal filing when in‐bankruptcy rules give
greater priority to particular creditors whom the owner would like to favor. These find‐
ings suggest that federal bankruptcy reforms, such as the Bankruptcy Abuse and Protec‐
tion Act of 2005, will have two effects on distressed small businesses—they will impact
outcomes in federal courts (intensive margin) as well as the debtor’s choice between
bankruptcy and non‐bankruptcy procedures (extensive margin). Variation along the ex‐
tensive margin can neutralize reforms in federal law, as when a reform designed to pro‐
tect unsecured creditors raises the cost of federal law and induces businesses to use
cheaper non‐bankruptcy procedures instead.
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Bargaining Around Bankruptcy:
Small Business Workouts and State Law

Federal bankruptcy filings are rare relative to the number of small businesses
that fail. About 540,000 small businesses closed their doors during 2003, but only 34,000
(six percent) filed petitions under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.1 Many businesses, to be
sure, close for reasons unrelated to financial distress and so are unlikely to be candi‐
dates for a bankruptcy filing. But the story changes little when we focus on businesses
in financial distress. For every 100 that shut down, fewer than twenty file for bank‐
ruptcy.2 The vast majority of small businesses resolve distress under state law. They re‐
negotiate with creditors (“workouts”) or invoke formal procedures for liquidating or
reorganizing a business, such as assignments for the benefit of creditors (“ABCs”).
These alternatives to federal bankruptcy law have received limited attention in
the academic literature. Non‐bankruptcy workouts have been studied by Gertner and
Scharfstein3, Gilson4, Schwartz5, White6, and others in the context of large corporate in‐
solvencies. It is generally thought, however, that workouts are undermined by hold‐out
and other coordination problems among the dispersed creditors of a large corporation.7
Such coordination problems are thought to be relatively unimportant among small
businesses. Adler, for example, assumes that these businesses are “subject to a single
dominant creditor or a coordinated group of creditors.”8 Nonetheless, few scholars have
studied out‐of‐bankruptcy bargains between the owner‐manager and dominant credi‐

Among businesses with one to ninety‐nine employees, nearly 540,000 shut down between 2002 and
2003. In 2003, about 35,000 businesses (of any size) filed bankruptcy petitions. Data on shutdowns is
taken from Small Business Administration, “Establishment and Employment Changes from Births and
Deaths by Firm Size and Major Industry, 2002‐2003,” available at <http://www.sba.
gov/advo/research/dyn_us03.pdf>. Data on bankruptcy filings is taken from Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, “Bankruptcy Statistics, 2003 Calendar Year by Chapter,” available at
<http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/1203f2.xls>.
2 See Section I infra.
3 Robert Gertner and David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. Fin.
1189 (1991).
4 Stuart C. Gilson, Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose between Workouts and Chapter 11, J.
App. Corp. Fin. 62 (Summer 1991); Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evi‐
dence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. Fin. 161 (1997).
5 Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J. L. & Econ. 595 (1994).
6 Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out‐of‐Court
Debt Restructurings, 10 J. L., Econ. & Org. 268 (1994).
7 Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 528 (1983);
Gertner and Scharfstein, supra.
8 Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343, 374‐75 (1997)
1
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tor. This may reflect an implicit assumption that these bargains tend to break down.
Baird9 and Adler10, for example, assume that that the going‐concern value of a small or
privately‐held business is tied to the human capital of the owner‐manager. This gener‐
ates a game, modeled explicitly by Baird and Picker11, in which the owner‐manager and
the senior creditor bargain over the going‐concern surplus. The bargain, in these papers,
is concluded in federal bankruptcy court.
The small‐business bargain could, however, be concluded outside bankruptcy
court. This point was recently emphasized by Mann12 in a study of failed high‐tech
startups, all of which were backed by venture capital. He found that only 22 percent of
these startups were liquidated under federal bankruptcy law. The remaining firms were
liquidated under state law, probably using the ABC process.13
This paper shows that bankruptcy filings are equally rare among small busi‐
nesses generally. Using unique data on distressed businesses located in Cook County,
Illinois, I find that bankruptcy law was used by only 16 percent of corporations and
only 20 percent of non‐corporate entities prior to liquidating or reorganizing. I also find
that one state law procedure, the ABC, is nearly as popular as federal bankruptcy law.
The paper also identifies conditions under which small businesses opt for the
federal Code instead of state‐law alternatives. Following Schwartz14 and White15, I
model the choice between state and federal law as the outcome of a bargaining game.
State procedures, such as workouts and ABCs, typically generate lower transaction
costs than a federal bankruptcy case. They may also create an opportunity to divert
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & Econ. 633, 636 (1993).
Adler, supra, at 374‐75.
11 Douglas G. Baird and Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorgani‐
zations, 20 J. Legal Stud. 311 (1991).
12 See Ronald J. Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of Failed High‐Tech Firms, 82 Wash. U.
L. Q. 1375 (2004).
13 Mann develops three theories that might explain the attractiveness of ABCs, relative to federal law,
among high‐tech startups and among businesses generally. First, businesses will opt for federal bank‐
ruptcy law when they seek greater leverage in negotiation with landlords and other contractual counter‐
parties. The Code, Mann noted, gives the debtor a unique opportunity to enforce leases that would be
unenforceable under state law, and to terminate leases without incurring the same liability that would
arise under state law. Second, a business will opt for federal law when it has made preferential payments
to some creditors, to the disadvantage of others. The Bankruptcy Code, Mann argued, offers a relatively
low cost procedure for recovering these payments. Finally, Mann hypothesized that popularity of ABC
procedures will vary by state, because the procedures are more heavily regulated in some states than oth‐
ers. The less heavily the procedure is regulated, he reasoned, the cheaper it is and the more likely it will
be used instead of federal law.
14 Schwartz, supra.
15 White, supra.
9
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value from dispersed unsecured creditors, whose claims are too small to induce them to
monitor a state or federal insolvency process. Coordination problems will also make it
difficult to organize an involuntary bankruptcy filing.16 A firm will, therefore, opt for
state procedures if its owner‐manager and senior lenders can agree on a division of the
surplus generated by state procedures.
If a firm has no senior lenders—that is, if all its debt is held entirely by dispersed
unsecured creditors—the owner‐manager will always choose state procedures and cap‐
ture the surplus for herself. If the firm has one senior lender—a secured creditor or a
large unsecured lender—the owner will need the lender’s consent before invoking any
state procedure. The parties will therefore bargain over the surplus. Bargaining may
break down, and a federal bankruptcy filing result, for the same reasons that lawsuits
may fail to settle out‐of‐court. The lender may distrust the owner’s disclosures about
the value of the firm’s assets, the owner may be overly optimistic about her payoffs in a
bankruptcy case (especially a Chapter 11 reorganization), or the parties may simply
make a mistake. If the firm has multiple senior lenders, the risk of bargaining failure
grows due to hold‐out problems.
The risk of bargaining failure may depend on the characteristics of state law pro‐
cedures, which vary substantially across the United States. An ABC, for example, is
regulated by statute and overseen by courts in New York; it is unregulated and requires
no court involvement in Illinois. If a firm is indebted to both insiders and third‐party
creditors, but pays the insiders first, state law authorizes creditors to sue insiders in
Massachusetts but not in Pennsylvania. Some state laws, then, offer greater protection
to creditors than others. As Mann17 notes, these protections generate transaction costs
and could make state procedures less attractive relative to the federal Code. But they
could also make the state procedures more attractive because they give creditors greater
authority to audit the firm and root out forms of self‐dealing. If a firm has a single sen‐
ior lender, but the lender distrusts the owner’s disclosures, the risk of bargaining fail‐
ure—and the likelihood of a federal bankruptcy filing—may be lower in states that give
the lender greater authority to audit the business and sue the owner if self‐dealing is
discovered.
I test these theories using firm‐ and state‐level data. The firm‐level data include a
random sample of distressed small businesses located in Cook County, all of whom
shut down or filed a bankruptcy petition. Among corporations in these data, I find that
the probability of a bankruptcy filing rises over 50 percent when the firm has secured
Generally, an involuntary bankruptcy petition needs the support of at least three creditors who, to‐
gether, have unsecured claims worth at least $12,300. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).
17 Mann, supra.
16
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debt, consistent with the simple bargaining model. The probability rises even further
when the firm must negotiate with multiple secured lenders, also consistent with the
theory that coordination problems increase the likelihood of bargaining failure. Finally,
the probability of bankruptcy doubles if, in addition to having multiple lenders, the
small corporation has defaulted on multiple bank loans. I interpret the latter pattern as
evidence that a firm is more likely to enter bankruptcy when senior lenders do not trust
the owner’s disclosures. A small business’s access to credit depends heavily on its rela‐
tionship with senior lenders. The closer the relationship, the lower the information
asymmetries between the lender and borrower. When a firm defaults on bank debt, it is
undermining its relationship with senior lenders and, consequently, reducing the ex‐
pected quality of the information provided to lenders.
State level data are less conclusive and leave some doubt regarding the impor‐
tance of variation in state law for small business corporations. I analyze annual Chapter
11 filing rates, by state, during the period 1990‐2004. Filing rates are lower in states that
give creditors broad authority to sue insiders for self‐dealing, but I find no evidence
that other regulations either increase or decrease the fling rate. These results offer weak
support for the notion that state law alternatives become more attractive, not less, when
they give creditors greater authority to audit the debtor business and attack insiders.
These dynamics help explain the rarity of bankruptcy among corporations. Little,
however, can be said about the rarity of bankruptcy among non‐corporate entities, such
as proprietorships and partnerships. Firm‐level data show that these businesses are
nearly 50 percent more likely to enter bankruptcy when they have defaulted on bank
debt, but they are no more or less likely to enter bankruptcy when they carry secured
debt or have borrowed from multiple creditors. Nor does variation in state law appear
to play any meaningful role in the bargaining process. To some extent, this is unsurpris‐
ing. A corporation can discharge its debts using state law procedures; once the corpora‐
tion dissolves, claims against it are effectively discharged. But the owner of a proprie‐
torship or partnership remains liable after the business entity dissolves. This suggests
that, in future work, data on non‐corporate entities should be analyzed using a bargain‐
ing model that accounts for the owner’s personal liability.
These observations have implications for bankruptcy theory and policy. First,
they show, consistent with the work of Adler18 and Schwartz19, that most small business
corporations adopt capital structures that avoid the need for federal bankruptcy filings.
Although federal bankruptcy law does serve the functions traditionally assigned to it—
Adler, supra.
Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J. L., Econ. & Org. 127 (1997); Alan Schwartz, A Con‐
tract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L. J. 1807 (1998).
18
19
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remedying collective action and other coordination problems under state law—these
functions are rarely needed by small business corporations.
Additionally, this paper supports theoretical arguments in the corporate finance
literature. The empirical results, for example, show that a bankruptcy filing is more
likely when a firm has multiple senior lenders, not multiple junior lenders. This is consis‐
tent with the claim, in Bris and Welch20, that financial distress is more costly when a
firm’s debt is concentrated in the hands of a few dominant lenders than when it is dis‐
persed across a large number of claimants.
Finally, the results in this paper raise questions about current U.S. policy regard‐
ing small business failure. Small businesses with fewer than 100 employees account for
over 36 percent of employment and 30 percent of annual revenue generated by all busi‐
nesses in the U.S. economy.21 The federal government maintains a variety of policies de‐
signed to help these businesses get started and to regulate their failure. These policies
assume, implicitly, that the Bankruptcy Code can be used to regulate failure. Recent
amendments to the Code, for example, impose reporting obligations, deadlines, and
other burdens on Chapter 11 debtors in order to improve payoffs to unsecured credi‐
tors.22 These amendments ignore the decisionmaking process of businesses choosing be‐
tween state and federal procedures. Any regulation that increases the burdens of fed‐
eral law will make state law more attractive. The recent amendments, then, may yield
precisely the opposite effect for many firms: instead of increasing payoffs to unsecured
creditors, the amendments may only reduce aggregate payoffs as these businesses sub‐
stitute toward state law. Federal bankruptcy policy, then, should focus not only on fed‐
eral law itself but also on likely substitution effects toward state law alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I documents the rarity of federal bank‐
ruptcy filings. Section II presents a simple model that isolates the important differences
between state and federal law and the trade‐offs facing a distressed small business. Sec‐
tion III summarizes the model’s empirical implications. Sections IV and V use firm‐level
and state‐level data, respectively, to test these implications. Section VI discusses the re‐
sults and VII concludes.

Arturo Bris and Ivo Welch, The Optimal Concentration of Creditors, 60 J. Fin. 2193 (2005).
Annual employment statistic reflects 2003 data; the revenue statistic reflects 2002 data. See Small Busi‐
ness Administration, “Private Firms, Establishments, Employment, Annual Payroll and Receipts by Firm
Size, 1988‐2004, <http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/dyn_b_d8903.pdf>.
22 See Section VI infra.
20
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I.

Bankruptcy’s rarity

Every year hundreds of thousands of businesses close their doors, but only tens
of thousands file petitions under the Bankruptcy Code. In 1998, for example, the Small
Business Administration (SBA)23 reported about 650,000 business failures. The same
year, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO)24 reported roughly 45,000 busi‐
ness bankruptcy filings. Most discussions of small business distress assume that federal
bankruptcy law is the primary mechanism for resolving distress. These statistics throw
that assumption into doubt.
The rarity of small business bankruptcy has been questioned by Lawless and
Warren,25 who argue that the annual number of federal business filings is dramatically
understated, thanks largely to poor record keeping by the AO, which assembles the
PACER database. Instead of assessing whether a debtor’s liabilities are primarily busi‐
ness debts, the AO relies on self‐reporting. But most debtors submit their federal bank‐
ruptcy filings using software in which the default setting is to treat all debt as consumer
debt. Because the classification of liabilities—business or consumer—matters little to
most debtors (and their lawyers), few alter the default setting. Put differently, even
when an individual debtor has significant business debt, her lawyer will typically use
software designed for debtors with primarily consumer debt. The result is that many
cases involving business debts are classified, for AO purposes, as consumer cases.
The under‐reporting problem is surely important, but it is not a complete expla‐
nation for the rarity of federal business bankruptcy filings. These filings were rare even
before bankruptcy lawyers began using consumer‐oriented software in the early 1990s.
In 1990, for example, business bankruptcy filings amounted to only 10.5% of all busi‐
ness failures.
Table 1 offers further proof that these aggregate patterns, drawn from govern‐
ment records, coincide with actual experience. Every Monday and Wednesday, the
Business Section of the Chicago Tribune publishes announcements of business auctions.
The announcements—collected under the heading “Auction Mart”— typically identify
the name of the business, its location, the nature of the assets, and the date of the auc‐
tion. The announcement may also indicate whether the auction is pursuant to bank‐
ruptcy court order. Figure 1 reproduces a typical Auction Mart. I collected data from
every Auction Mart published during calendar year 1998. Table 1 summarizes the re‐
Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Dynamic Data—Births, Deaths, Growth, and Decline—
State Major Industry Data, 1989‐1998, 1998‐2003, http://www.sba.gov/ advo/research/data.html.
24 PACER Bankruptcy Statistics, Statistical Reports, Table F‐2, http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov/.
25 Elizabeth Warren and Robert Lawless, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, Calif. L. Rev.
(2006).
23
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sults. About 300 auctions were announced, but a business name was identified in only
254 cases. Nearly every case involved a corporation. For each business, I determined
whether it had filed a federal bankruptcy petition during the preceding 5 years. This
was true in only thirty‐five cases, implying that federal bankruptcy law was used by
only 13.5 percent of businesses being auctioned. In another thirty‐four cases, the auction
announcement indicated that the business was being sold off in conjunction with an
ABC. This state procedure, then, was as common as federal bankruptcy cases, again
suggesting that a significant fraction of distressed businesses resolve distress without
resorting to federal law. Indeed, it is highly likely that far more than thirty‐four of the
254 businesses were auctioned off pursuant to an ABC. As the next section explains, an
ABC auction must be announced publicly, usually in a newspaper, but there is no re‐
quirement that the announcement indicate that the auction is part of an ABC.
II.

State versus Federal Law

Broadly speaking, federal law offers a relatively costly mechanism for auditing
distressed business and distributing payments to creditors. State procedures are
cheaper—they generate less administrative expense and are faster and more private—
but they are less transparent. Debtor businesses reveal less about their capital structure
and can potentially hide insider self‐dealing or preferential treatment of particular
creditors.
For owner‐managers, state procedures are often preferable. They will receive lit‐
tle payoff in federal bankruptcy court, because the outstanding debt typically exceeds
the value of the firm’s assets and the Code’s “absolute priority rule” forbids payments
to equityholders unless creditors are paid in full. Owners could benefit from a federal
bankruptcy case if the absolute priority rule is violated (which seems to occur fre‐
quently26) or if the owner can continue running the business in bankruptcy,27 but these
benefits are probably small. Owners may receive higher payoffs under state law. Be‐
cause a federal case imposes significant costs on creditors, senior lenders will be willing
to pay owner‐managers not to file a federal bankruptcy petition. If the payment exceeds
any benefits the owner might receive in federal court, the owner will agree to use state
insolvency procedures instead.
But state procedures may not always be cheaper for senior lenders. These proce‐
dures require the consent of all secured creditors and lienholders. If these parties are

Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, and Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11
Reorganization, 61 J. Fin. 1253 (2006).
27 Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 2310 (2005).
26
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large in number, coordination costs and holdup problems may eliminate the gains from
state procedures. Additionally, it may be difficult to audit a small business outside of a
federal bankruptcy case. In federal court, the judge and United States Trustee can force
the debtor to reveal information about the business and its past transactions. Creditors
can also use the bankruptcy process to unwind transactions that favored insiders or
third parties. Bankruptcy law, in other words, protects creditors from insiders as well as
other (insider‐favored) creditors. Outside federal court, it may be impossible or very
costly for creditors to conduct a similarly rigorous audit. Thus, if senior lenders think
that the owner possesses private information about the value of business assets, they
may prefer a federal bankruptcy case to state procedures.
A business’s choice between state and federal law, then, is the product of a bar‐
gaining game between debtors and their senior lenders. The dynamics of this game will
depend heavily on the characteristics of state law. These dynamics are best illustrated in
the context of a simple model that is close in spirit to the bargaining games studied by
Baird and Picker28 and Schwartz29.
A.

A simple model

Consider a distressed small business corporation with a simple capital structure:
it has borrowed s on a secured basis from a bank and u on an unsecured basis from n
trade creditors with identical claims. The business is distressed because total debt, s + u,
exceeds the value of its assets a. The value a could represent the liquidation value of the
assets or the going‐concern value of the business; the particular interpretation does not
matter for purposes of this paper.
Federal bankruptcy. At any time, the debtor can choose to file a federal bank‐
ruptcy petition. The filing of a petition initiates an “automatic stay,” that is, an injunc‐
tion prohibiting any creditor collection efforts.30 This injunction gives the debtor time to
liquidate assets (often under Chapter 7) or commence a bargaining process that may al‐
low the debtor to readjust its capital structure (Chapter 11). Creditor consent is unnec‐
essary. Indeed, the very purpose of the automatic stay is to force non‐consenting credi‐
tors to participate in a collective proceeding.
A federal bankruptcy petition will generate transaction costs t1 for the debtor and
t2 for the bank, which must hire professionals to monitor the case. If the debtor does file
a petition, the payoffs to the creditors and owners will be largely dictated by the Bank‐

Baird and Picker, supra.
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, supra.
30 11 U.S.C. § 362.
28
29
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ruptcy Code’s absolute priority rule, although the owner may be able to extract a small
payoff b.31 Secured creditors will receive the value of their collateral; unsecured credi‐
tors will share pro‐rata in the remaining value of the firm, less value extracted by the
owner.32 The owner’s payoff b can be viewed as a payment to induce the owner to
speed up the bankruptcy process; or it can be viewed, as in Baird and Picker,33 as the
owner’s bargained‐for share of any going‐concern surplus.
In federal bankruptcy court, then, the bank’s net payoff will be sb=min{s,a‐b‐t1}‐t2.
If value remains after paying the bank, unsecured creditors will receive ub=(a‐b‐s‐t1)/n.
The owner will receive ob=b. I am assuming here that the owner has not personally
guaranteed the debts of the business, which occurs frequently. If the owner has person‐
ally guaranteed the debts, or if the business is structured as a proprietorship or partner‐
ship that lacks the limited liability of a corporation, the creditors’ payoffs will depend
on the value of both the business assets and the owner’s personal assets.
State procedures. Instead of filing a federal bankruptcy petition, the debtor could
use state procedures to resolve its distress. A wide variety of procedures are available.
They include simple foreclosures, in which a bank seizes and forces a sale of business
assets; bulk sales, in which the debtor sells most or all of its business to a third party
and distributes proceeds to creditors; and assignments for the benefit of creditors, in
which the debtor assigns its business to a trustee, who sells the business and distributes
proceeds to creditors. These state procedures can be used both to liquidate and to reor‐
ganize the business.34 To illustrate, suppose the debtor would like to reorganize via an
ABC. To do this, the owner‐manager will assign the business to an assignee and, at the
same time, enter an operating agreement in which the assignee agrees to employ the
owner‐manager to run the business while the assignee prepares to auction it off. At the
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
There are important complications, however. Among unsecured creditors, sections 507 and 726 of the
Code establish an additional priority scheme. Tax claims, for example, receive eighth priority, meaning
that tax collectors receive payment only if sufficient assets exist to pay higher priority unsecured claims
first (such as administrative costs and certain employee wage and benefit claims). If sufficient assets do
exist, tax claims will be paid in full before any value is shared with general trade creditors.
33 Baird and Picker, supra, at 337‐38.
34 Malanie Rovner Cohen and Joanna L. Challacombe, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors—Contemporary
Alternatives for Corporations, 2 DePaul Bus. L. J. 269, 271 (1990). See also Rally Capital Services, LLC, As‐
signment for the Benefit of Creditors (2006) (marketing materials distributed by assignee located in Cook
County, Illinois) (“for debtors who are not insolvent, but merely troubled, ABCs may also be employed to
effect reorganization”); David S. Kupetz, Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: Advantageous Vehicle for
Selling and Acquiring Distressed Enterprises, 6 J. Private Equity 16, 18 (2003) (“An assignment for the benefit
of creditors can serve as a very useful and efficient means of … facilitating a buyer’s acquisition of a trou‐
bled business or assets from an entity burdened with unsecured debt (and, with the cooperation of se‐
cured creditors, secured debt).”).
31
32
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auction, the owner‐manager will bid on the assets, perhaps with financing offered by a
senior lender, which “rolls over” its claim.35 If she offers the high bid (and she fre‐
quently is the only bidder), she will regain control of her firm. Importantly, the firm’s
capital structure will have changed radically. Security interests and liens will remain;
they travel with the assets. But unsecured debt will have been washed away.36
These state procedures, however, require the consent of senior lenders. In the
ABC process, for example, debtor assigns assets to an assignee subject to existing liens.
Thus, nothing stops a bank or other secured creditor from exercising its ordinary fore‐
closure rights. Most loan agreements, for example, declare that default occurs automati‐
cally when the debtor files a federal bankruptcy petition or conducts an ABC. The as‐
signment process triggers this covenant, allowing the creditor to commence collection
efforts and enforce security interests.
Junior creditors, however, have little power to interfere with the ABC process.
Their consent is not required; it is presumed because the process creates a trust that will
divide assets equitably among the creditors.37 Unsecured creditors can sue the assignee
for breach of fiduciary duties, but the incentive to monitor the ABC process will be very
low for most unsecured creditors, whose claims will be small relative to the costs of
monitoring. Unsecured creditors might try to halt the ABC process by filing an involun‐
tary bankruptcy petition, but it is rare for creditors to attempt this. An involuntary peti‐
tion requires coordination among at least three creditors whose unsecured claims ex‐
ceed $12,300.38 Because most unsecured creditors have small claims, coordination prob‐

Stromberg observed the same phenomenon in Sweden, which auctions off all firms in bankruptcy. Per
Stromberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641
(2000).
36 The same outcome could be achieved other ways. The owner‐manager could, for example, permit the
bank to foreclose and then repurchase the assets at the foreclosure sale. But, relative to ABC, a foreclosure
is typically unattractive to a debtor because she exercises less control over the asset sale. The foreclosing
creditor or a government official will auction the assets. Additionally, the owner‐manager will be unable
to continue running the business after foreclosure. Even if she is able to repurchase the business at auc‐
tion, the delay between foreclosure and repurchase may be long enough to cause serious harm to the
business.
A creditor may also prefer ABC over a foreclosure. The ABC auction is conducted by an assignee,
not the creditor, which insulates the creditor from potential lender liability. Geoffrey L. Berman, Common
Law Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors: The Reemergence of the Nonbankruptcy Alternative, 21 Cal. Bankr.
J. 357, 359 (1993).
37 For a summary of state laws regulating the ABCs, see Garrard Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation 172‐
213 (1935); John Hanna, Contemporary Utility of General Assignments, 35 Va. L. Rev. 539 (1949).
38 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).
35
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lems will deter the filing of an involuntary petition. Another deterrent is the possibility
that, once the involuntary petition is filed, the bankruptcy court will dismiss the case.39
Secured creditors, then, exert significant control over state procedures. In gen‐
eral, a debtor will be unable to pursue an ABC or other procedure without consent of
the lending bank, IRS, and other secured creditors and lienholders.40
State procedures typically generate lower transaction costs than a federal bank‐
ruptcy petition. The administrative costs of a federal bankruptcy case, which include
court fees and the professional fees of attorneys, consume about ten percent of firm
value.41 In a study of cases filed in the District of Arizona and Southern District of New
York between 1995 and 2001, most of which were small business cases, Bris, et al. found
that the administrative costs of a Chapter 7 case averaged about $12,000 and those of a
Chapter 11 case about $30,000.42 State law procedures are generally thought to be
cheaper.
In print, many practitioners have stated that state procedures are cheaper—they
are faster and generate less administrative cost than a federal bankruptcy case.43 The
cost savings come from several sources. First, because state procedures are often man‐
aged by professional assignees, not courts, there are few procedural roadblocks that
slow down the process. Additionally, the procedural hurdles in bankruptcy court—

See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Gear Co., 304 B.R. 784, 785 (Bankr. S.D. Oh. 2003) (“courts generally dismiss an
involuntary case under § 305(a)(1) where the debtor has made an assignment for the benefit of credi‐
tors”). See also In re Baileyʹs Beauticians Supply Co., 671 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir.1982); Mike C. Buckley & Greg‐
ory Sterling, What Banks Need to Know About ABCs, 120 Banking L.J. 48 (2003).
40 The IRS will frequently impose a lien on business assets for overdue taxes. See Baird and Morrison, su‐
pra.
41 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, and Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation versus Chapter 11
Reorganization, 61 J. Fin. 1253, 1287 (2006).
42 Id. at 1281‐1282.
43 See, e.g., Mann, supra, at 1392‐93 (concluding, based on interviews with practitioners, that “the net cost
of the process seems to be less than a bankruptcy proceeding”); Cohen and Challacombe, supra, at 270
(“In contrast to a Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code, an assignment is generally more effi‐
cient, less costly, of shorter duration, more successful in terms of the value received for the assts and
amounts paid to creditors and more tailored to the needs of debtors and their creditors.”); Bruce C.
Scalambrino, Representing a Creditor in an Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors, 92 Ill. Bar J. 263 (2004) (de‐
scribing Illinois law, the author explains that “ABCs take less time than bankruptcy and require less in
the way of court intervention and approval, which can mean lower professional fees for debtors.”); Ku‐
petz, supra, at 18 (“Compared to bankruptcy liquidation, assignments may involve a faster and more
flexible liquidation process.”).
39
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formal notice to creditors, oversight by the U.S. Trustee—generate administrative costs
that are avoided in many state procedures.44
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we can normalize the costs of state
procedures to equal zero. Creditors’ priorities under state law are largely similar to
their priorities in bankruptcy. Secured creditors will be paid first; unsecured creditors
will be paid out of the remaining assets. There are a few exceptions to this rule. One in‐
volves the IRS, which can demand the right to be paid in full before any other unse‐
cured creditor receives payout.45 The IRS does not receive as high of priority in bank‐
ruptcy. The simple model here ignores this exception, but I will incorporate it in the
empirical analysis in Sections IV and V because it can be an important factor in a busi‐
ness’s decision to use state or federal law.46 Many owner‐managers are personally liable
for business tax debts because they failed to ensure that the business delivered payroll
withholding taxes to the federal government. Because the IRS receives greater priority
under state law than in bankruptcy court, the owner‐manager may prefer a state pro‐
ceeding in order to minimize her personal liability.
Returning to the simple model, the bank and owner will generally prefer state
procedures, because they yield the same outcomes (liquidation or reorganization) at
lower cost. The bank can avoid its own costs t2; the business can avoid costs t1. The total
savings, t=t1+t2, will be split between the bank and owner because the owner can credi‐
bly threaten to file a bankruptcy petition if it does not receive some share of the gains.
Let δ denotes the owner’s share. The bank’s payoff will be sp=min{s+(1‐δ)t1, a‐b‐ δt1}‐
δt2=min{s+t1,a‐b}‐ δt. The owner’s will be op=b+ δt. Notice that, state procedures allow the
manager to enjoy a further deviation from the absolute priority rule—a payoff even
when unsecured creditors are not paid in full—because the senior lender and manager
share the costs saved by not invoking federal law. This deviation would occur even if
b=0. The more costly is federal law, the greater the gains to the senior lender and man‐
ager, and the lower the payoffs to unsecured creditors.
Notice as well that, if the business has no secured debt, the owner will always
choose state procedures and keep for herself the gain t1. Empirically, then, firms with no
secured debt should be highly likely to choose state procedures. Firms with one secured
creditor should also be highly like to choose state procedures, unless bargaining costs

See Mann, supra, at 1392‐93. Additionally, the owner‐manager often waits to commence state proce‐
dures until she has found a buyer for the business (the buyer may be a new corporation organized by the
owner‐manager). Id.
45 31 U.S.C. § 3713; People v. United States, 328 U.S. 8 (1946).
46 Cohen and Challacombe, supra note 34, at 277.
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are high, due perhaps to asymmetric information. I consider this possibility in Section
II.B below.
Diverting value from unsecured creditors. The senior lender and manager could
enjoy even greater payoffs if it is costly for unsecured creditors to identify firms with
assets sufficient to yield payoffs in bankruptcy – that is, firms in which ub=(a‐b‐s‐ t1)/n>0.
To illustrate, assume there are two types of businesses: type 1 firms with assets worth al
and type 2 with assets ah, where ah> al. An unsecured creditor can observe the two types,
but must incur cost c to verify this information (c could, for example, represent the cost
of filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition). Among type 1 firms, if the payoff to unse‐
cured creditors in bankruptcy is ub1 ≤ c, then unsecured creditors will not threaten to
force these firms into federal bankruptcy court. Senior lenders and managers will in‐
stead divert to themselves the payoff ub1 that would otherwise go to unsecured credi‐
tors. (A third party might enter this market and recapture these gains. It might, for ex‐
ample, offer to monitor debtors in exchange for a payment equal to c/n from each unse‐
cured creditor. Under these conditions, type 1 firms would be forced into bankruptcy
only if ub1 > c/n.)
In practice, type 1 firms may be large in number. Data from bankruptcy courts
suggest that very few businesses have sufficient assets to ensure a non‐trivial payoff to
unsecured creditors. In Chapter 7 filings, which make up about 67% of all business fil‐
ings,47 the typical payoff to unsecured creditors is about 1% of the face value of the
debt,48 and most of this is likely paid to tax collectors.49 The payoffs in Chapter 11 cases
are rarely much larger. About 70% of Chapter 11 cases are dismissed or converted to
Chapter 7.50 Among small‐business cases that result in a plan of reorganization, the
payoff to non‐tax unsecured claims is zero in about 40% of cases and less than ten per‐
cent overall.51 The payoffs to unsecured creditors, then, are small in bankruptcy, regard‐
less of the outcome.
This suggests that unsecured creditors will rarely object to state procedures, be‐
cause bankruptcy cases rarely yield non‐trivial payoffs. Moreover, unsecured creditors
may not find it cost‐effective to monitor debtors and object when a federal bankruptcy
case would yield larger payoffs than a state procedure. The cost of monitoring may ex‐

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (data for fiscal year 2006).
Bris, Welch & Zhu, supra, at 1290.
49 Baird, Bris & Zhu, supra (showing, in Chapter 11 cases, that tax debts consume the bulk of assets that
remain after payments are made to secured creditors).
50 Morrison, supra, at Table 4.
51 Baird, Bris, & Zhu, supra, at 22‐23 (reporting recoveries for businesses with assets worth $1 million or
less at the start of the case).
47
48
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ceed the expected payoff. This will make state procedures attractive to debtors, who can
capture value that would be paid to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy court.52
The foregoing analysis, however, that state proceedings discharge creditors’
claims and that they cannot subsequently bring suit against the owner‐manager person‐
ally. This would be possible if she had guaranteed the debtor or if the business were or‐
ganized as a proprietorship or partnership. The gains, to the manager, from state pro‐
cedures will be highest when the business is a corporation and the owner has not guar‐
anteed the debts.
B.

A richer model

The model thus far implies that state procedures will always be chosen when a
debtor suffers distress: senior lenders and managers receive higher payoffs under state
procedures than in federal court; unsecured creditors may receive slightly lower payoffs
but have no incentive to force debtors into federal court. This model, however, makes
two assumptions: (1) there is only one senior lender, the bank, and (2) the senior lender
has perfect information about the debtor’s assets. When these assumptions are relaxed,
a distressed business may choose federal bankruptcy law instead state procedures.
Multiple lenders. When a business has multiple senior lenders—several banks,
the IRS, a landlord—the likelihood of bargaining failure increases. Each lender holds
the power to veto any bargain struck under state law. Consider, for example, an ABC.
Typically, the debtor will assign its assets to an assignee, who is charged with responsi‐
bility for conducting an auction and distributing the proceeds to creditors in order of
priority.53 As a formal matter, creditor consent is not required. Consent is instead pre‐
sumed because the assignment creates a trust that will divide assets equitably among
the creditors. Once the assets are auctioned off, they are sold free and clear of existing
unsecured debt. If the proceeds are insufficient to pay the debtor’s creditors in full, they
may file suit against the debtor personally. If the debtor is a flesh‐and‐blood person, the
suit may yield some recovery. If the debtor is a corporation, the suit will be fruitless; the
assignment effectively terminates the corporation’s existence.

State procedures, such as ABCs, have long been seen as devices to shield insider self‐dealing, preferen‐
tial payments to favored creditors, or other pre‐petition conduct that would not withstand scrutiny in a
federal bankruptcy court. Several (anonymous) practitioners described ABCs in precisely these terms. See
also Benjamin Weintraub, Harris Levin, and Eugene Sosnoff, Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors and
Competitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent Estates, 39 Cornell L. Q. 3, 4 (1953) (“The general weakness
of the out‐of‐court proceeding . . . is its susceptibility to abuse.”).
53 For a summary of state laws regulating the ABCs, see Garrard Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation 172‐
213 (1935); John Hanna, Contemporary Utility of General Assignments, 35 Va. L. Rev. 539 (1949).
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Although creditor consent is presumed, any secured creditor can unwind the
ABC. The assignment process conveys the debtor’s assets subject to existing liens. Thus,
nothing stops a bank or other secured creditor from exercising its ordinary foreclosure
rights. Most loan agreements, for example, declare that default occurs automatically
when the debtor files a federal bankruptcy petition or conducts an ABC. The assign‐
ment process triggers this covenant, allowing the creditor to commence collection ef‐
forts.
Because state procedures require the consent of all senior lenders, coordination
problems can result. Assume, for example, that the debtor has borrowed s1 and s2 on a
secured basis from two banks, B1 and B2. Each bank possesses a security interest in dif‐
ferent, non‐overlapping assets, a1 and a2, which together comprise total firm assets
(a1+a2=a). In bankruptcy court, each bank will incur the transaction costs t2; the firm itself
will incur costs t1. The banks’ in‐bankruptcy payoffs are therefore s1b=min{s1,a1‐b‐ t1}‐ t2
and s2b=min{s2,a2‐b‐t1}‐ t2. The banks will permit the debtor to use state procedures if
their payoffs are larger. Total costs avoided under state procedures are t1+2 t2. Some of
this gain must be paid to the manager to induce her to avoid a federal filing; the rest
will be shared among the creditors. Bargaining over this surplus can lead to holdout
problems, because each party knows that its consent is required before a state proce‐
dure can be finalized. Each player—the banks and the manager—will delay consenting
to state procedures in order to extract a greater fraction of the transaction costs avoided.
Bargaining can also be costly. As the number of senior lenders increases, so do the co‐
ordination costs, which may swamp the gains from state procedures.54 If these kinds of
problems are severe, a debtor may be unable to use state procedures and be compelled
to use federal bankruptcy law.
Asymmetric information. The likelihood of a federal bankruptcy filing may rise
when it is costly for senior lenders to verify the value of a debtor’s assets. Secured credi‐
tors have relatively strong information about a business. As Scott55 has shown, a pri‐
mary function of secured debt is to overcome information asymmetries: a security inter‐
est gives the lender power to monitor the business, influence management prior to fail‐
ure, and sanction misbehavior by seizing firm‐specific assets. The lender’s broad “hos‐
tage‐taking” power gives the borrower strong incentives to disclose information and
manage the business prudently. Information asymmetries are not, of course, eliminated
by secured debt. Lenders may have incomplete information about insider self‐dealing

Mann hypothesized a similar dynamic, arguing that federal procedures will be most attractive to larger
businesses with more complicated capital structures. Mann, supra.
55 Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986). See also George G.
Triantis, Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1992).
54
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or the debtor’s potential liability to third parties (for, say, torts).56 When a firm’s owners
have private information about the value of assets, a secured lender may prefer federal
bankruptcy law as a mechanism for verifying asset value. The incentive to use federal
law will, of course, be even stronger when there are multiple secured creditors, who
may have different beliefs about asset value.
As Webb and others have emphasized,57 federal bankruptcy law serves an im‐
portant auditing function. A federal court offers a venue in which a debtor’s assets and
debts can be verified rigorously. After commencing a federal bankruptcy case, the
debtor or its trustee must file various reports, which lay bare the business’s financial
position and operating history (a trustee manages the debtor’s assets in a Chapter 7
case).58 If the owner of the business fails to submit this information, the case will typi‐
cally be dismissed.59 If the owner conceals information, she will be sanctioned for con‐
tempt of court.60 In addition, the debtor or trustee is empowered to search for and attack
insider self‐dealing and eve‐of‐bankruptcy payments to favored creditors.61 Both actions
protect the rights of creditors to receive payment before equityholders and to receive
equal treatment among creditors of equal contractual priority. They also provide a
mechanism that protects senior creditors from self‐dealing by insiders and preferential
treatment of junior creditors. In many bankruptcy cases, the claims of secured creditors
and tax authorities exceed the value of the business assets; unsecured creditors will re‐
ceive nothing.62 Rules governing preferential transfers provide a mechanism for recov‐
ering property from insiders and preferred creditors.
It may be more costly (or impossible) to conduct a rigorous audit under state
law. Return to the simple model of bargaining between the senior lender and the owner
of a distressed business. Suppose the lender believes that the owner may be concealing
information about the value of the business assets. It could enter a contract with the
business, offering to share the gains from using state procedures if the owner consents
A large literature documents the importance of alternative mechanisms for overcoming information
asymmetries. One much‐discussed mechanism is “relationship‐based lending.” See, e.g., Mitchell A. Pe‐
tersen and Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of Firm‐Creditor Relationships: Evidence from Small Business
Data, 49 J. Fin. 3 (1994); Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in
Small Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351 (1995).
57 David C. Webb, The Importance of Incomplete Information in Explaining the Existence of Costly Bankruptcy,
54 Economica 279 (1987). See also David C. Smith and Per Stromberg, “Maximizing the Value of Dis‐
tressed Assets: Bankruptcy Law and the Efficient Reorganization of Firms,” working paper (Mar. 2004).
58 § 521.
59 This occurs routinely in Chapter 11 cases. See Morrison, supra.
60 F. R. Bankr. Proc. 9020.
61 §§ 544, 547, 548.
62 See, e.g., Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris, and Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An
Empirical Study, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05‐29 (December 2005).
56
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to an audit of the business. Assume, however, that the lender would incur costs t3 to
conduct the audit. Because of this expense, the lender will not audit every business. It
will most likely randomly audit a fraction of firms; in so doing it will reduce owner’s
incentive to conceal information. But when a senior lender does choose to audit a busi‐
ness, it bears fully the costs of the audit, t3. In bankruptcy, audit costs—t1+t2—are shared
with unsecured creditors if the value of the firm exceeds the senior lender’s claim. Un‐
secured creditors will bear some or all of costs t2. Thus, even if an audit under state law
would be cheaper than one in federal court (t3<t1+t2), a senior lender will prefer a federal
court audit if its share of the auditing costs are lower in federal court (t1<t3).
A senior lender may prefer federal court even when the cost of an audit under
state law is less than the lender’s own costs in federal court. Assume that t3<t1 or that if
t3<t1+t2 and the lender’s claim exceeds the value of business assets (so that it would bear
all bankruptcy costs). An audit under state law may be less effective than one in federal
court. A senior lender may have little or no authority to force the owner to disclose in‐
formation about the business’s prior transactions or payments. The lender may also lack
authority to bring suit against owners for certain kinds of self‐dealing. Authority could
be obtained under the original loan agreement. Creditors could demand personal guar‐
antees from these individuals, especially the insiders, but guarantees are—for various
reasons—not demanded in many small business loans. Only about 60% of small busi‐
ness corporations obtain loans with guarantees from insiders.63 When a lender has not
obtained a guarantee from insiders, an audit under state law may be less effective than
one in federal court.
The lender may be able to conduct more rigorous audits in some states than oth‐
ers. States such as Iowa, New York, and Texas, have adopted fairly comprehensive
regulations governing the ABC process. The regulations require the debtor to give pub‐
lic notice of the assignment, give courts power to oversee the assignment process, and
obligate the assignee to post a performance bond, file financial schedules the court, ap‐
praise the value of the assets, and sue creditors or insiders who received preferential
payments.64 These rules increase the information available from an audit and enhance
the power of senior lenders to recover assets from insiders and third parties. The ABC
Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, and Katherine A. Samolyk, The Role of Personal Wealth in Small
Business Finance, 22 J. Bankr. & fin. 1019, 1032‐33 (1998) (using the 1993 National Survey of Small Business
Finance). See also Baird and Morrison, supra, at 2362 (finding that the owner‐manager had personally
guaranteed non‐tax debt in 56 percent of corporate Chapter 11 cases filed in the Northern District of Illi‐
nois during 1998).
64 Weintraub, et al., provide a detailed comparison of statutory and non‐statutory regimes across the
United States. They distinguish “comprehensive,” “non‐comprehensive,” and non‐statutory regimes. See
Benjamin Weintraub, Harris Levin, and Eugene Sosnoff, Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors and Com‐
petitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent Estates, 39 Cornell L. Q. 3, 14‐25 (1953).
63

18

process is far less regulated in states such as California, Illinois, Nevada, and Virginia.65
Although the trustee may be required to notify creditors, attack payments to insiders,
and give public notice of the auction, little else regulates the process. There is generally
no court involvement. Nor is there public notice. No documents are filed with a court;
no announcements are posted in newspapers. Even credit reporting bureaus, such as
Dun & Bradstreet, typically do not know whether a business used a state procedure. All
it knows is that the business “faded away.”66 In other states, the ABC process is more
heavily regulated. Some states, such as Iowa, New York, and Texas, have adopted com‐
prehensive statutory frameworks that require the debtor to give public notice of the as‐
signment, give courts power to oversee the assignment process, and obligate the as‐
signee to post a performance bond, file financial schedules the court, appraise the value
of the assets, and sue creditors or insiders who received preferential payments.67 An
audit under state law, then, may yield less information and a lower payoff to senior
lenders than one conducted in federal court. The difference between state and federal
audits, however, will vary by state.
The Appendix illustrates these points in the context of a simple model.
III. Empirical Implications
The theory outlined in the previous section has two empirical implications:
among distressed businesses, the probability of a bankruptcy filing will rise when (i) the
business has multiple senior lenders and (ii) information asymmetries prevent senior
lenders from gauging the value of business assets. In Sections IV and V, I propose vari‐
ous proxies for businesses with these characteristics. Businesses with multiple senior
lenders, for example, may have more than one bank lender, have incurred tax debts
(which are often subject to liens), or face suits filed or judgments obtained by unsecured
We see comparable variation—in transparency and creditor protection—in other procedures for liqui‐
dating or reorganizing troubled businesses. A “bulk sale,” for example, is a sale of business assets to a
creditor or other purchaser. Until recently, most bulk sales were governed by Article 6 of the UCC, which
was meant to protect creditors against fraudulent sales. The typical example is the small business that
acquires goods on credit, sells them in bulk, and then disappears with the proceeds. Beginning in the
early 1990s, many states repealed Article 6 or adopted a revised version. The statute was thought to im‐
pose undue burdens on legitimate bulk sales, especially when other statutory provisions—such as Article
9 and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)—offer protection against fraudulent sales. Today, in
many states, bulk sales offer a lightly‐regulated method for selling a troubled business. See generally Peter
A. Alces, The Confluence of Bulk Transfer and Fraudulent Disposition Law, 41 Ala. L. Rev. 821 (1990).
66 [cite D&B internal report]
67 Weintraub, et al., provide a detailed comparison of statutory and non‐statutory regimes across the
United States. They distinguish “comprehensive,” “non‐comprehensive,” and non‐statutory regimes. See
Benjamin Weintraub, Harris Levin, and Eugene Sosnoff, Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors and Com‐
petitive Systems for Liquidation of Insolvent Estates, 39 Cornell L. Q. 3, 14‐25 (1953).
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creditors. Once an unsecured creditor reduces its claim to a judgment, it typically ob‐
tains a lien claim against the debtor’s assts.
Similarly, a proxy for asymmetric information problems is whether the business
has defaulted on senior debt or been habitually late in payments. This kind of behavior
damages the business’s relationship with the senior lender, which may lead the bank to
be more skeptical about the owner‐manager’s reports. Information problems could be
mitigated by laws that promote the transparency of state procedures. These kinds of
laws will increase the attractiveness of state law if they are highly valuable to senior
lenders. Rules that are valuable only to unsecured creditors could decrease the attrac‐
tiveness of state law. Rules in the former category probably include regulations that po‐
lice insider self‐dealing. Secured creditors probably worry little about the possibility
that a business will favor particular unsecured creditors. The owner of a distressed
business is much more likely to favor herself, especially because a large fraction of small
business debt—about 25% among businesses with fewer than 20 employees—is typi‐
cally owed to insiders or other individuals who are likely related to insiders.68 Thus,
fraudulent conveyance law may be particularly valuable to senior lenders as it allows
creditors to sue insiders who received payments when the business was insolvent. This
suggests that state procedures will tend to be more popular in states with strong
fraudulent conveyance laws. These laws are largely the same across the fifty states, with
one important exception: only 38 states have adopted § 5(b) of the UFTA, which gives
creditors power to sue any insider who receives payment on account of antecedent debt
while the business is insolvent.69 If § 5(b) is an important device for senior creditors,
state procedures will be more commonly used in states that have adopted this provision
of the UFTA than in those that have not adopted it.
Table 3 summarizes these and several other hypotheses that can be drawn from
the discussion in Section II. First, an owner’s gains from state procedures will be larger
when the business is organized as a corporation than when it has adopted a legal form
without limited liability. If a proprietorship uses a state procedure, the owner remains
personally liable even after the procedure ends. She can avoid this liability only by fil‐
ing a bankruptcy petition. Even if the senior lenders would agree not to bring suit
against the owner personally, it would be prohibitively costly to obtain the same
agreement from all unsecured creditors. Thus, the primary implications of the model in
Section II—(i) multiple creditors and (ii) asymmetric information—should be observ‐
able among corporations but perhaps not among other business forms.

Allen N. Berger and Gregory F. Udell, Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Im‐
portance of Bank Organisational Structure, 112 Econ. J. F32, F35‐F36 (2002).
69 See Table 2 infra.
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Second, if a firm’s capital structure is relatively complex or if it has suffered a fi‐
nancial shock, resulting in rush of creditors bringing collection efforts, it may be unable
to obtain quick consent from key creditors.70 It may feel compelled to file a federal bank‐
ruptcy petition in order to protect its assets via the automatic stay.71 A rush of creditors
is likely, for example, when a business has suffered a fire or burglary, or when it has
experienced an unexpected financial shortfall following unsuccessful expansion or
other change of business.
Third, because creditor priorities differ under state and federal law, a distressed
business may favor the legal procedure that minimizes the owner’s personal liability or
limits the claims of particular creditors. As explained above, a business may be more
likely to favor state procedures over federal law when tax debts are significant. Federal
law typically makes the owner personally liable for these debts. Because the IRS re‐
ceives higher priority in state procedures than in federal bankruptcy court, the debtor
may prefer state procedures because they reduce her potential liability. Conversely, a
business may be less likely to favor state law when the business leases real estate or
other assets.72 In federal bankruptcy court, the debtor can enforce lease contracts even if
it has committed a material breach that would, under state law, entitle the lessor to ter‐
minate the contract.1 Additionally, in bankruptcy a debtor can breach a lease contract
and cap the damages otherwise payable to the landlord under state law.1
Finally, the characteristics of the business or its owner may affect the probability
of a bankruptcy filing. Blanchflower, et al.,73 for example, find evidence that minority‐
owned small businesses face discrimination in credit markets. If lenders are unwilling
to refinance distressed minority‐owned firms, these firms may find Chapter 11 attrac‐
Mann, supra, at 1409, makes a similar point.
When a debtor files a federal bankruptcy petition, an injunction issues, enjoining all creditor collection
efforts. The injunction applies equally to creditors who have obtained liens but not levied upon property,
those who have suits pending, and those preparing to bring suit or assert self‐help remedies. The auto‐
matic stay gives the debtor time to conduct an orderly liquidation or negotiate a plan of reorganization.
State bankruptcy procedures offer significantly less protection to a debtor harassed by creditors.
A bulk sale does nothing to stop a creditor from bringing suit against the debtor and perhaps even the
buyer. When a business conducts an ABC, the assets are protected from most collection efforts, but credi‐
tors with liens may assert them. Additionally, creditors are free to bring suit against the debtor person‐
ally. Of course, if the debtor is a corporation, the assignment typically involves dissolution of the busi‐
ness, mooting any suits against the debtor itself.
72 See Berman, supra, at 361 (“[W]here the debtor has a leasehold interest in real property, the execution of
a general assignment typically causes the underlying lease to become void, by reason of the ipso facto
clause in the lease. State law does not help whereas the bankruptcy code has specific language invalidat‐
ing that clause.”).
73 David G. Blanchflower, Phillip B. Levine, and David J. Zimmerman, Discrimination in the Small‐Business
Credit Market, 85 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 930 (2003).
70
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tive, because it offers a court‐supervised opportunity to reorient business operations
and bargain with pre‐petition creditors. To be sure, credit‐market discrimination may
reduce opportunities for minority‐owned firms to grow in size. And if minority‐owned
businesses are relatively small, they may be less able to afford the federal bankruptcy
process. Conditional on size, however, the existence of credit‐market discrimination
could increase the probability that a minority‐owned distressed business will file a fed‐
eral bankruptcy petition.74 The same dynamics might be present in women‐owned small
businesses, although empirical studies find no evidence of capital market discrimina‐
tion.75
Geography too may play a role in explaining the popularity of the Bankruptcy
Code relative to state law procedures. First, bankruptcy filings may be more common in
urban areas, where the extent of the market permits specialization by attorneys. Spe‐
cialization may lower the relative cost of federal bankruptcy cases, which appear to re‐
quire greater attorney involvement than many state procedures. Secondly, business
bankruptcy filings may be more common in states with relatively high personal bank‐
ruptcy filing rates. If variation in personal filings rates is due to unobservable heteroge‐
neity in the preferences or opportunities of citizens, the same heterogeneity may affect
the frequency of business bankruptcy filings.
IV. State versus Federal Law: Firm‐Level Variation
State‐level data are too coarse to permit tests of most hypotheses discussed in
Section III. Ideal data would permit a comparison of two groups of distressed busi‐
nesses: (i) distressed businesses that filed federal bankruptcy petitions prior to shutting
down or restructuring (“bankruptcy exits”) and (ii) distressed businesses that used state
law procedures, such as ABC, to accomplish the same purposes (“state exits”). With
such data in hand, the following discrete‐choice model could be used to identify factors
that make a federal bankruptcy filing more or less likely:
E[BankruptcyExiti] = F(Hypothesesi,Controlsi)

(1)

Dawsey and Ausubel, however, find the opposite pattern in their study of distressed consumers, who
can discharge debt by filing a federal bankruptcy filing or by forcing creditors to pursue collection under
state law. See Amanda E. Dawsey and Lawrence M. Ausubel, “Informal Bankruptcy,” SSRN working pa‐
per (Feb. 2002). Because many creditors will “charge off” a debt instead of pursuing collection, Dawsey
and Ausubel argue that distressed consumers face a choice between “formal bankruptcy” (a federal fil‐
ing) and “informal bankruptcy” (placing the burden on creditors to assert state law remedies). The au‐
thors find that members of minority groups are more likely than other borrowers to choose “informal
bankruptcy.” The authors do not, however, offer a theory that might explain this pattern.
75 Arne L. Kalleberg and Kevin T. Leicht, Gender and Organization Performance: Determinants of Small Busi‐
ness Survival and Success, 34 Acad. Mgmt. J. 136 (1991).
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Here, F(∙) is the cumulative density function for a particular distribution, usually
normal (for a probit) or logistic (logit). “BankruptcyExiti” is a dummy variable equal to
one if firm i is a member of the bankruptcy exit group and zero otherwise. “Hypothe‐
sesi” is a vector of proxies for the hypotheses in Table 3 and “Controlsi” is a vector of
variables that account for other possible determinants of a firm’s decision to file for fed‐
eral bankruptcy.
Model (2) requires data on two groups, bankruptcy exits and state exits. Ideal
data do not exist, but we can get close to the ideal using records assembled by Dun &
Bradstreet (D&B), a credit reporting bureau.
A.

Data

D&B records financial and operational information about the majority of busi‐
nesses located in the United States. The SBA estimates that about 24.7 million firms
were active in the U.S. economy during 2004. D&B’s records for roughly the same pe‐
riod included about 18 million firms, 73 percent of the SBA total. Missing from D&B’s
database are businesses with no debt. D&B’s mission is to offer reliable information
about the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. A business usually does not enter
D&B’s database until a bank or trade creditor seeks (or reports) information about the
business. This selection bias is unimportant for the analysis here, which evaluates the
choice between state and federal law among distressed businesses. That choice will be
meaningful only for indebted businesses. A business without debt generally will not
consider a bankruptcy filing.
D&B’s records document the credit history, annual sales, employment, location,
and other characteristics of businesses. D&B also tracks the financial condition of every
business using a proprietary index, the Financial Stress Score (FSS), which ranges from
1 to 5. Scores above 3 are indicative of distress; an FSS of 5 represents severe distress.
The index is strongly correlated with the likelihood of suspending operations. Among
firms with an FSS equal to 1, the probability of closing within one year is 0.5 percent.
Among firms with an FSS equal to 4 or 5, the probability is 8 percent and 36 percent re‐
spectively.
D&B records depart from the ideal in several respects. They indicate whether a
business shut down and whether it filed for bankruptcy. But if a business shut down
without filing a bankruptcy petition, the records do not indicate whether the business
used a particular state law procedure to liquidate or reorganize, merged with another
firm, or shut down because the owner decided to move out of state or on to new pro‐
jects. Thus, the population of “business shut downs” will include distressed businesses
that shut down or reorganized using state bankruptcy law (state exits) as well as

23

healthy businesses that shut down because there were better uses for the physical assets
or the owner’s human capital (call these “healthy exits”). For this study, only state exits
are relevant. I isolate this group, as explained below, by focusing on businesses with
high Financial Stress Scores. In general, I assume that a shutdown is a “state exit” if the
business (i) exited without filing a bankruptcy petition during the preceding three years
and (ii) exited at a time when its FSS equaled 4 or 5 (in some tests, I focus only on highly
distressed firms with an FSS equal to 5).
Another shortcoming of the D&B data is the limited information about a busi‐
ness’s capital structure. The records indicate whether, when, how often, and on what
terms a business has borrowed from a bank or purchased goods on credit. They also in‐
dicate whether the business is late in making payments. But the records do not tell us
the total value of the business’s assets or liabilities. Thus, we do not know how leverage
varies across businesses in the database. We can only infer this from various proxies,
such as the FSS, the size of the firm (measured in terms of sales or employment), and
whether the business took on secured debt.76
B.

Sample Selection

Because D&B data are expensive, I limited my analysis to a sample of small, pri‐
vately‐held businesses located in Cook County, Illinois. I define a “small business” as
one with 500 or fewer employees. In 1998, D&B maintained records on nearly 160,000
privately‐held businesses in Cook County, about 99 percent of which had 500 or fewer
employees.
As a preliminary step, I drew a sample of 2,000 businesses that were operating as
of January 1, 1998. As Panel A of Table 4 illustrates, the sample was stratified. A third of
the sample consisted of businesses in high distress (FSS equal to 5), another third of
businesses in moderate distress (FSS equal to 4), and a final third of businesses in low or
no distress (FSS below 4). Within each third, the sample was split evenly between cor‐
porations and non‐corporations (partnerships and proprietorships). For each business,

The D&B data are also noisy. Data on a firm’s annual sales are available for some years but not others.
When these data are available, the same sales volume may be reported for multiple years, suggesting that
D&B reproduced data from past years when it was unable to contact a business in the current year. Along
the same lines, important variables, such as the gender of the owner and whether the business rents or
owns real estate, are missing for a large number of businesses. Some of these problems, such as missing
or duplicate sales data, can be minimized by computing annual averages for each business. The averages
will moderate the noisiness. Other problems, such as underreporting of gender and real‐estate owner‐
ship, can be ignored if I assume that reporting biases do not differ across the two groups that are the fo‐
cus of this paper: bankruptcy exits and state exits.
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D&B provided annual financial and operational information for every year from 1998
through 2004, or until the business terminated operations, whichever occurred earlier.
This exploratory analysis confirmed the rarity of federal bankruptcy filings. Ta‐
ble 4 shows that, among corporations in high distress (FSS=5) on January 1, 1998, nearly
50 percent ceased operations within seven years. Among those that shut down, only
15.6 percent filed a federal petition. The bankruptcy rate is a bit higher (16.9 percent)
among non‐corporations. These percentages measure the bankruptcy rate among all ex‐
iting businesses, regardless of whether they were distressed at the time of exit. Limiting
the sample to businesses that exited in distress, as the final columns of Panel A do, the
percentages rise slightly. It may seem odd that some bankruptcies are not “distressed
bankruptcies” in Panel A. Among high‐distress corporations, the number of bankrupt‐
cies is 25, but the number of distressed bankruptcies is 20. Because it is unlikely that a
healthy business would file for bankruptcy, the disparity most likely reflects measure‐
ment error. In particular, D&B obtains business information from two sources: from its
own data‐colleting efforts and from public records. It is not uncommon that D&B will
know that a business filed for bankruptcy but have little additional information about
it. Such a business may have a low FSS. To avoid this measurement problem, the analy‐
sis below will generally focus on bankruptcy filings by businesses that, based on D&B
records, were distressed at the time of filing.77
Given the rarity of bankruptcy exits, a simple random sample will not yield
enough bankruptcy exits and state exits to implement model (2). An attractive alterna‐
tive is choice‐based sampling. Instead of drawing a random sample from the population
of all small businesses, I could draw random samples from the following sub‐
populations: (i) distressed businesses that filed a federal bankruptcy petition between
January 1998 and January 2005 and (ii) distressed businesses that shut down during the
same period without filing a bankruptcy petition. This sampling methodology has the
advantage of cost‐effectiveness. The downside is that it distorts the representativeness
of the overall sample. For any given business in the choice‐based sample, the probabil‐
ity of selection differs from the probability of selecting the same businesses from the
general population. By artificially restricting the population to groups (i) and (ii), I have
inflated the probability of selection for businesses in both groups. I have also altered the
relative probability of selection between the two groups. This complication, however,
has a simple fix: the data can be weighted by the probability of selection.
Applying this methodology, I narrowed the sampling population to all busi‐
nesses that suffered distress between 1998 and 2000 and shut down at some date prior
This restriction has little effect on the analysis, however. In general, the patterns reported below do not
change when the analysis is broadened to include all bankruptcies, regardless of the level of distress.
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to 2005. From this population of businesses, I drew two samples: 927 state exits and 364
bankruptcy exits. As Panel B of Table 4 shows, the state exits sample represents about
66 percent of all such exits in the population; the bankruptcy exits sample accounts for
100 percent of these exits in the population. Within each group, the samples are divided
between businesses in high distress (FSS=5) and moderate distress (FSS=4) and between
corporations and non‐corporations. For each business, the data include annual financial
and operational data from 1994 through 2004.
Together, the samples in Panels A and B of Table 4 represent the primary data for
the tabular and multivariate analysis that follows. I will compare state exits to bank‐
ruptcy exits among the subset of distressed businesses. This is a valid way to test theo‐
ries regarding the choice between state insolvency procedures and federal bankruptcy
law if my measure of distress is accurate. It is probably safe to assume that all bank‐
ruptcy exits involve distressed businesses; rarely will a healthy business file a bank‐
ruptcy petition. Among state exits, however, it is possible that some of these exits in‐
volve businesses that appear distressed but are in fact solvent. I treat a business as “dis‐
tressed” if its financial stress score (FSS) exceeds 3, but Panel A of Table 4 shows that
many distressed firms never shut down. Among corporations with an FSS equal to 5 in
January 1998, for example, only 48 percent exited within the following seven years; the
percentage is only 29 for corporations with an FSS equal to 4. Thus there is a risk that, in
comparing state exits to bankruptcy exits, I am making two comparisons simultane‐
ously: (1) state exits versus bankruptcy exits, among distressed businesses, and (2) state
exits by healthy businesses versus bankruptcy exits by distressed businesses. I am inter‐
ested in comparison (1), not (2).
I evaluate this potential problem below by running the analysis separately for
two samples: a sample consisting of both moderately and highly distressed businesses
(FSS equal to 4 or 5) and a sample limited to businesses with an FSS equal to 5. State ex‐
its involving healthy businesses will be more common in the former group than the lat‐
ter. If some patterns are important in the first sample, but not the second, they probably
tell us little about the choice between state and federal law among distressed businesses
(comparison (1)). They instead tell us something about the difference between healthy
and distressed businesses (2).
Another way to evaluate this problem is to identify the patterns that distinguish
healthy and distressed businesses and compare these to the patterns that distinguish
state exits from bankruptcy exits. To make this comparison, I gathered data on appar‐
ently healthy (FSS below 4) and distressed businesses (FSS equal to 4 or 5) that shut
down during the period 1998‐2000. As Table 5 illustrates, the sample includes about
1,000 exits by distressed businesses and over 850 by healthy businesses.
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C.

Variables

The central hypotheses of this paper are that the probability of a federal bank‐
ruptcy filing rises as (i) the number of senior lenders increases and (ii) information
asymmetries become more severe. The D&B data contain various proxies for the num‐
ber of senior lenders, as summarized in Table 6. One is the number of UCC filings con‐
tained in public records (“Any UCC filings,” “One UCC filing,” “Over one UCC fil‐
ing”). A secured creditor will generally file a UCC‐1 financing statement with the Illi‐
nois Secretary of State. Additional proxies are the number of banks that submitted
credit information to D&B about a particular business (“One bank,” “More than one
bank”) and whether the public records report any liens filed against the business (“Any
liens”). A useful proxy for information asymmetries is whether a lending bank reported
that its relationship with the debtor business has deteriorated, due to defaults, habitu‐
ally late payment, or other factors (“Poor banking history”, “Poor banking history, 1
bank”, “Poor banking history, >1 bank”). Given the importance of relationship banking
in small business lending, it seems reasonable to infer that a bank will put less trust in a
debtor’s disclosures if the bank’s relationship with the debtor has deteriorated. Another
proxy is the age of the business (“Age”, “Management tenure”). Because most busi‐
nesses maintain a relationship with a single bank, the age of the business may be a good
proxy for the duration of its relationship with the bank. The longer the relationship, the
less likely is there to be an important information asymmetry between the bank and the
debtor.
Section III identifies several other factors that may affect the choice between state
and federal procedures. Federal law may be attractive to businesses that operate out of
rented real estate. Relative to state law, the Code gives the debtor greater bargaining
power with respect to landlords. The D&B data indicate whether a business rents or
owns its facility, and whether it operates out of the owner’s home (“Rents”). Federal
law may also be attractive to businesses that have suffered financial shocks or face a
rush of creditors bringing suit. These businesses may not have sufficient time to invoke
state procedures; they may need the benefit of the Code’s automatic stay immediately.
D&B data indicate whether a business faces suits and judgments (“Any
suits/judgments”). They also indicate whether it has undergone a recent change in own‐
ership, name, or location (“Changed owner, location, name”). These kinds of changes
occur during a period of instability in the business, suggesting the occurrence of a
shock.
Other variables, summarized in Table 6, could also affect the likelihood that a
distressed business enters federal bankruptcy court. These include the debtor’s size (as
measured by sales and employment), its relationship with trade creditors, whether the
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business filed a bankruptcy petition in the past, and the race and gender of the owner.
Another important variable for a proprietorship is whether the owner‐manager has
made tangible, personal investments in the business. The business, for example, might
be operated from the owner’s home (“Run from owner’s home”). In the event of dis‐
tress, a federal bankruptcy filing may be attractive to the owner because it shields “ex‐
empt” assets from creditor collection efforts. These “exempt” assets are, to be sure, usu‐
ally protected from collection under state law as well, but it will be very difficult for the
owner to sell the assets. Once sold, the proceeds are subject to creditor collection efforts.
A federal bankruptcy filing “washes” the exempt assets of potential claims by unse‐
cured creditors.
D.

Summary Statistics

Tables 7 through 9 provide summary statistics for all sample businesses and for
corporations. Although D&B data are panel data, with annual observations on every
business, I was unable to exploit this time variation. As noted above, the data are noisy;
in many cases, for example, variables such as sales or employment are the same for sev‐
eral years. Because of problems like these, I treated the data as cross‐sectional. For each
business, I computed averages for each of the variables in the database. In most cases,
the average is based on data for the three years preceding the date of business shut
down. Thus, Tables 8 and 9 compare state exits to bankruptcy exits during the three years
preceding exit.
Overall, the sample businesses are quite small. The average business has 15 em‐
ployees and annual sales of $1.45 million. The business has been in operation at least 10
years (based on management tenure) and perhaps as many as 14 years (based on D&B’s
estimate of firm age, which appears to be biased upward78). Over half of the businesses
operate in the services and retail sectors; another 25 percent operate in construction and
wholesale. The corporations in the sample are slightly larger (around 19 employees and
annual sales of about $2 million) and have greater representation in the manufacturing
sector. These characteristics are typical of small corporations in bankruptcy and of small
corporations generally, as Table 7 shows.
Tables 8 and 9 also present data on the gender and race of the owner‐manager,
but the data are puzzling. These tables show that women‐owned businesses account for
only about four percent of businesses; minority‐owned businesses account for about

In many cases, the age reported in D&B records is greater than the age that the business itself reported
to the Illinois Secretary of State.
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eight percent. In data collected by the Federal Reserve,79 these percentages are much
larger: 24 percent for women‐owned businesses and 15 percent for minority‐owned.
The differences could reflect flawed data collection by D&B.
Comparing state exits and bankruptcy exits, Tables 8 and 9 show that bank‐
ruptcy exits tend to have slightly fewer employees but slightly greater annual sales than
state exits. They are much more likely to involve businesses that have filed bankruptcy
petitions before and to be concentrated in the construction sector.
Aside from these differences in background characteristics, the tables show that
bankruptcy exits differ from state exits along many of the margins suggested by the
simple model of Section II. First, bankruptcy exits are substantially more likely to have
incurred secured debt (“Any UCC filings”). A business without secured debt is more
likely to use state procedures because it faces none of the problems—coordination prob‐
lems among senior lenders and asymmetric information—that confront can prevent a
business with secured debt from using state law. Second, bankruptcy exits are signifi‐
cantly more likely to involve businesses with multiple UCC filings (“Over one UCC fil‐
ing”) and multiple banks (“More than one bank”), consistent with the hypothesis that
the probability of a federal filing rises with the number of creditors. Finally, the debtor’s
relationship with its senior lenders is significantly worse among businesses that invoke
federal law (“Poor banking history”). This too is consistent with the hypothesis that
federal bankruptcy filings are more likely when asymmetric information problems are
significant.
Other hypotheses find support in Tables 8 and 9 as well. Bankruptcy exits are
more likely to involve businesses that operate from rented facilities, consistent with
Mann’s hypothesis. Also, bankruptcy exits are more likely to involve businesses facing
suits and judgments, suggesting that a business facing time constraints is less able to
use state procedures.
E.

Results

Table 10 reports estimates of model (2), assuming F(∙) follows a logistic distribu‐
tion. The data are limited to distressed businesses (with an FSS equal to 4 or 5). The de‐
pendent variable, BankruptcyExit, equals one if a business filed a bankruptcy petition
within three years of shutting down; it equals zero otherwise. Standard errors are ro‐
bust, all continuous variables are logged, and the data are weighted by (the inverse of)
their sampling probabilities. Coefficients are reported as odds ratios, with p‐values

Marianne P. Bitler, Alicia M. Robb, and John D. Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: Evi‐
dence from the 1998 Survey of Small business Finances, Federal Reserve Bulletin 183, 186 (April 2001).
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shown in brackets. Thus, a ratio above (below) 1 implies that the covariate is positively
(negatively) correlated with the probability of a bankruptcy filing.
Column (1) presents a simple regression with only two proxies for the number of
senior lenders (“Any UCC filings” and “Any liens”) and for information asymmetries
(“Poor banking history” and “Management tenure”). The results are largely consistent
with the tabular comparisons in Tables 8 and 9. Among distressed corporations, the
probability of filing a bankruptcy petition rises significantly for businesses with secured
debt, liens, and sour relationships with senior lenders—all consistent with the central
hypotheses of this paper that federal cases are more likely when a business has secured
debt, multiple senior lenders, and private information about the value of its assets. Al‐
though the estimates are only marginally significant, the age of the business, as proxied
by “Management tenure,” reduces the likelihood of a bankruptcy filing. This too is con‐
sistent with the hypothesis that lenders have greater information about old firms, which
probably have longstanding relationships with the lenders.
These effects are economically significant. Column (1), for example, reports that
the average marginal effect of “Any UCC filings” is .114, meaning that the probability
of a federal bankruptcy filing rises 0.114 when a distressed corporation has incurred se‐
cured debt. Given that the unconditional probability of a bankruptcy filing is 0.168 (see
Table 9), the presence of secured debt raises the probability of a bankruptcy filing to
about 0.278, a 62 percent increase. Poor banking history has a comparable effect.
Other hypotheses appear to play a less important role in determining the choice
between state and federal law. A business that rents its facility is more likely to use fed‐
eral law, as Mann predicted, but the effect is not significant. The lack of significance,
however, is partly the product of strong multicollinearity between this variable and two
others – “Any suits and judgments” (correlation equal to 0.23) and “Poor trade credit
history” (0.20). When only one of these variables is included in the analysis, that vari‐
able becomes marginally significant, as Column (2) illustrates.
The estimates in Columns (1) and (2) are drawn from a sample of distressed cor‐
porations. Column (3) re‐estimates the model on the subsample of distressed partner‐
ships and proprietorships. The importance of secured debt largely disappears—“Any
UCC filings” and “Any liens” are at best marginally significant—but the debtor’s rela‐
tionship with its bank remains an important determinant of federal filings. Other hy‐
potheses, such as whether the business rents its facility, seem not to matter. Unsurpris‐
ingly, the probability of a federal filing by a proprietorship or partnership rises substan‐
tially if the business operates out of the owner’s home (although the estimate is only
marginally significant). This is consistent with the notion that sole proprietors find the
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Bankruptcy Code attractive when they have made large personal investments in their
businesses.
Columns (1) through (3) include any business with an FSS equal to 4 or 5. If some
of these businesses were actually healthy firms—because the FSS variable is not per‐
fectly correlated with distress—the patterns in Columns (1) through (3) may reflect dif‐
ferences between healthy and distressed businesses that exited during the sample pe‐
riod, not differences between distressed business that filed for bankruptcy and distressed
businesses that used state law procedures. In order to isolate the latter comparison,
Column (4) re‐estimates model (2) using the subsample of corporations with the highest
FSS (equal to 5). The overall results do not change. The statistical significant of some co‐
efficients falls, but this is unsurprising because the sample size has fallen by about fifty
percent. Overall, the estimates in Column (4) suggest that the patterns in Table 10 are
not biased by the presence of healthy exits among the businesses that chose state over
federal law.
Table 11 augments the basic empirical model to include a richer set of proxies for
the number of creditors and for information asymmetries. As in the basic model, the
presence of multiple secured lenders (“Over one UCC filing”) markedly increases the
probability of a federal filing by distressed corporations. See Columns (1) and (3). The
probability of bankruptcy also rises when the business has only one secured lender. I
treat this as evidence that, even with a single senior lender, bargaining failure may oc‐
cur due to information asymmetries or other problems.
Table 11 offers additional evidence that information asymmetries are important.
In Columns (1) and (3), the probability of a federal filing is substantially larger when a
small business corporation has harmed its relationship with multiple lenders (“>1 re‐
ported default”). Interestingly, it is unclear whether the probability of bankruptcy rises
when a business defaults on only one bank loan (“1 reported default”). The coefficient is
marginally significant in Column (1) but insignificant when the sample is limited to
highly distressed corporations in Column (3).
Finally, column (4) redefines the dependent variable to equal one when a dis‐
tressed business exits and zero when a non‐distressed business exits. This model, then,
compares distressed exits to healthy exits. About 44 percent of exits are distressed exits.
The estimates reported in Column (4) are very large but qualitatively the same as those
in the other columns of Table 11: relative to healthy exits, distressed exits are much
more likely to involve firms with significant secured debt, liens, suits and judgments,
poor relationships with creditors, and prior bankruptcy filings. Healthy exits, then, dif‐
fer from distressed exits along largely the same margins that distressed exits differ from
bankruptcy exits. This suggests that firms in bankruptcy tend to be more distressed
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than firms that use state procedures, and both types of firms are more distressed than
healthy businesses that shut down. This conclusion is somewhat unsurprising: a major
determinant of a distressed business’s choice between state and federal law—its rela‐
tionship with senior lenders—is undoubtedly a major factor used by D&B in assessing
the business’s distress level.
V.

State versus Federal Law: State‐Level Variation

Federal bankruptcy cases are significantly more common in some states than
others. Table 2 sorts the states by the frequency of federal filings per 1000 business
deaths (the frequencies here equal the annual average over the period 1990 to 2004).
Delaware is an extreme outlier, with over 270 filings per 1000 deaths. The state with the
next highest incidence is Nevada, with 47 filings. At the low end is North Dakota, with
almost 6 filings per 1000 deaths. Focusing on the top five and bottom five states (exclud‐
ing Delaware), the incidences are strikingly different, ranging from 37 to 47 among the
top five and from about 6 to 8 at the bottom end. The mid‐point of the bottom range (7)
is 83 percent lower than the mid‐point of the top range (42).80 Some of this inter‐state
variation may be explained by the hypotheses set out in Section III.
A.

Methodology and Data Sources
To test these hypotheses, I estimate a simple regression model using state‐level

data:
BankruptcyRatest = β´Hypothesesst + δ´Controlsst + εst

(2)

“BankruptcyRatest” measures the number of business bankruptcy cases (filed under the
Bankruptcy Code) per 1,000 business deaths in state s during year t. Similarly, for state s
during year t, “Hypothesesst” is a vector of proxies for the hypotheses in Table 3 and
“Controlsst” is a vector of variables that account for other possible determinants of the
variation in BankruptcyRate (e.g., region dummies). Because the proxies for “Hypothe‐
ses” are generally time‐invariant, this model will be identified primarily by variation
across the states. Because observations for a particular state will be highly correlated
over time, I estimate standard errors that are clustered by state.
BankruptcyRate. The dependent variable is the ratio of (a) the number of busi‐
ness bankruptcy filings to (b) the number of business failures (per state, per year). Data
Similar variation emerges if we sort the states by the number of corporate bankruptcy filings per 1000
deaths (see the first column of Table 2). Among the top five states, the incidence ranges from about 21 to
30; among the bottom five, it ranges from about 4 to 7. The midpoint of the bottom range (5.5) is 78 per‐
cent lower than the midpoint of the top range (25.5).
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on (b)—business failures—are available from the Small Business Administration (SBA).
A “business failure” is defined as the closure of any business that employed one or
more workers. This definition is overly broad for purposes of this study; it captures
businesses that closed in distress as well as those that closed for reasons unrelated to
distress (e.g., a merger or acquisition). Because of this, BankruptcyRate measures the ra‐
tio of bankruptcy filings to total business closures, not closures of distressed businesses.
Assuming no systematic variation across states in the composition of business closures
(distressed versus non‐distressed closures), the overly broad definition of business fail‐
ure will not bias the analysis below.
Data on (a)—the number of business bankruptcy filings—are available from two
sources with differing coverage. The Federal Judiciary publishes annual statistics on
bankruptcy filings by chapter and debtor type (business or non‐business). These
“PACER”81 data capture the universe of filings, but provide little information about the
underlying business. The data only reveal whether the debtor believed that most of its
debts were business‐related (if so, the case is deemed a business filing). But even this
information is noisy. As noted earlier, it appears that many debtors—especially sole
proprietors—are unsure whether to treat their debts as “primarily” business‐related
and defer to the default setting in bankruptcy filing software, which answer the ques‐
tion in the negative and treat all debt as consumer debt. Thus, PACER data are compre‐
hensive but offer limited information about business filings.
More detailed but less comprehensive data are available from the Federal Judi‐
cial Center’s closed‐claim database,82 which contains information about case outcomes.
From these “FJC” data we can determine whether the debtor was a corporation. The
data are less comprehensive because they capture any case filed after October 1993 but
closed before 2003. Long‐lived cases, which have not closed by the end of 2003, will be
undercounted by these data. This censoring problem matters most for corporate bank‐
ruptcies, which can extend for many years.
I use these data sources—PACER and FJC—to compute alternative measures of
BankruptcyRate, including the ratio of total business bankruptcy filings (“All Bus. Fil‐
ing Rate”), business Chapter 11 filings (“Bus. Ch. 11 Filing Rate”), and corporate filings
(“Corp. Filing Rate”) to business failures. The first measure, derived from PACER, is
comprehensive but noisy. The second, also from PACER, is consistently coded and
The data are available on‐line through PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records”), a website
maintained by the Federal Judiciary. See PACER Bankruptcy Statistics, Statistical Reports, Table F‐2,
http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov/.
82 Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base Bankruptcy Petitions, 1994‐2003, Study Nos. 4303‐4306, 4086,
4088, 4249‐4252, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/.
81

33

therefore less noisy, but mixes corporate and non‐corporate cases (individuals often file
Chapter 11 petitions). The final measure offers a precise measure of corporate bank‐
ruptcy filings, but is drawn from the FJC database, which suffers the censoring problem
described above.
Hypotheses. A principal hypothesis of this paper is that federal bankruptcy fil‐
ings are driven by information asymmetries that cannot be resolved in state procedures.
But some states have adopted laws that reduce information asymmetries. These laws
give local courts power to oversee state procedures and give creditors power to sue in‐
siders who engage in various forms of self‐dealing. If these laws have an important ef‐
fect on information asymmetries, federal bankruptcy filings—especially filings by cor‐
porations—will be less common in states with these kinds of laws than in those without
such laws.
Data on state laws are available from state codes and case law and is summa‐
rized in Table 2. Forty‐five states adopted the UFTA between 1985 and 2006. Among the
adopting states, six chose not to adopt section 5(b), which gives creditors power to sue
insiders who received payments that were denominated as repayments of loans. With
respect to ABC regulations, Table 2 identifies five categories of rules. The first (“General
Preferences”) protects creditors generally by giving the ABC assignee power to sue
creditors who received preferential treatment before the debtor executed the assign‐
ment process (“General Preferences”). The next three categories promote the transpar‐
ency of the state process: these rules mandate court oversight (“Court Oversight”), al‐
low creditors to appoint trustees or assert other formal powers during the proceedings
(“Creditor Oversight”), or require an ABC assignee to post bond, file financial schedules
with a court, obtain an appraisal of the assets, or perform other duties (“Other Regula‐
tions”). The final category (“Preferential Assignments OK”) identifies states that allow
an assignee to favor some creditors over others during the assignment process. This rule
may make state law attractive to businesses seeking to favor creditors to whom the
owner‐manager has offered a personal guarantee. These creditors often include the IRS.
Most laws governing ABC were adopted in the late 1800s and early 1900s, reduc‐
ing concerns that non‐random adoption of laws may produce biases in the empirical
work. The UFTA, however, has more recent vintage. Most of the adoptions occurred
during the 1980s (21 adoptions) and 1990s (18). The potentially non‐random adoption of
the UFTA, and of section 5(b) in particular, points to potential endogeneity bias.83

Another potential source of bias arises from the possibility that laws governing state insolvency proce‐
dures affect the capital structure decisions of healthy firms. Laws that alleviate information asymmetries
will tend to reduce senior lenders’ costs when a debtor business becomes insolvent. These laws could,
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The implications discussed in Section III include the additional hypothesis that
distressed businesses will favor state law when it gives higher priority to debts—such
as tax debts—for which the owner‐manager may be personally liable (although the
presence of tax debt could also push firms toward federal law, because the IRS may not
consent to state procedures). Thus, we might expect federal bankruptcy filings to be less
common in states in which the IRS is more aggressive in imposing tax liens. To test this
hypothesis, I gathered data on the annual number of tax liens. After dividing this num‐
ber by annual state population, I divided the states into two groups—high tax lien
states and low tax lien states. During a given year, high tax lien states are those in which
tax‐liens‐per‐capita exceeds the national median for that year.
B.

Summary Statistics

Table 12 summarizes the variables and data sources. These variables include
proxies for the hypotheses described above as well as controls for the proportion of
state population living in urban areas (“Urban Population”), the number of consumer
bankruptcy filings per capita (“Consumer Filing Rate”), and alternative measures of lo‐
cal economic conditions (“Firm Growth Rate” and “Employment Growth Rate”). An‐
other possible control variable is the average duration of Chapter 11 cases filed in the
state (“Average Case Length”). Case duration could be correlated with case complexity
as well as the inefficiency of local bankruptcy courts.
Table 13 presents summary statistics (all continuous variables are logged). Two
patterns are noteworthy here. First, “Insider Preferences” and “Court Oversight” are
significantly negatively correlated with BankruptcyRate, as measured by the number of
corporate and business Chapter 11 filings per 1,000 business deaths (see columns II and
III).84 This is consistent with the hypothesis that federal bankruptcy filings are less
common in states with laws that promote the transparency of state procedures and in
those that protect senior lenders. The correlation becomes small and insignificant when
we use a broader measure of BankruptcyRate (“All Bus. Filing Rate”), suggesting that
state laws are indeed most important to corporations.
The second noticeable pattern is the negative correlation between the first two
measures of BankruptcyRate and laws permitting assignees to favor particular creditors
(“Pref. Assignments OK”). This too is consistent with the hypothesis that state laws are
therefore, reduce the price of credit to businesses located in the state. It is unclear, however, how greater
access to capital affects the popularity of federal bankruptcy cases versus state procedures.
84 Although both “Insider Preferences” and “Court Oversight” are negatively correlated with Bank‐
ruptcyRate in columns I and II, it is possible that only one will be significant in multivariate statistical
analysis. As the continuation of Table 5 shows, the various measures of state laws are significantly corre‐
lated.

35

attractive when they permit deviations from the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority
rule. Interestingly, however, the opposite (positive) correlation is observed when Bank‐
ruptcyRate is measured as total business filings per 1,000 business deaths (Column IV).
Finally, it is unclear whether the BankruptcyRate is higher or lower in states with
relatively high tax liens per capita. Recall that, in theory, we cannot predict the direction
of the effect: state law may be more attractive in these states (because the IRS enjoys
higher priority outside bankruptcy) or less attractive (because debtors must seek IRS
consent to state procedures).
C.

Results

Tables 14 and 15 report estimates of equation (1). The tables differ primarily in
terms of the data used to compute BankruptcyRate: Table 14 uses the PACER bank‐
ruptcy filings data; Table 15 uses the FJC closed case database. All continuous variables,
including BankruptcyRate, are logged.
Across both tables one consistent pattern emerges: corporate Chapter 11 filings
are significantly lower in states with laws that offer relatively strong and creditor pro‐
tection. When BankruptcyRate is measured as the number of Chapter 11 filings per
1,000 business deaths, the coefficient on “Insider Preferences” is consistently negative
and ranges between 0.190 and 0.258, implying that Chapter 11 filings are nearly ten per‐
cent lower in states that have adopted § 5 of the UFTA. Outside corporate Chapter 11
cases, “Insider Preferences” loses its significance. When BankruptcyRate is measured as
the number of corporate filings (Chapter 11 or Chapter 7) per 1,000 business deaths,
only “Court Oversight” becomes (marginally) significant. But the estimate is not robust
to alternative specifications. Nor is it robust to alternative measures of the Bank‐
ruptcyRate, as Column (3) of Table 14 and Column (6) of Table 15 illustrate. The results
for “High Tax Liens” are similarly inconclusive.
Together, Tables 14 and 15 offer suggestive evidence that state law matters to
corporations seeking to reorganize. Chapter 11 filings are less common in states that of‐
fer greater protection to creditors—in the form of laws limiting preferential payments to
insiders. Although this result is robust to alternative specifications (it persists in the
most parsimonious models as well as the most complete), it would be a mistake to put
much weight on it. State laws are correlated with bankruptcy filing rates, but it is unclear
whether variation in state law causes variation in bankruptcy filing rates. The correlation
could just be an artifact of other, non‐legal factors that have not been omitted from my
analysis.85 Correlation, in other words, does not imply causation. This truism can be
85

See generally Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. Am. Stat. Assn. 945 (1986).
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overcome only with better data, particularly data on bankruptcy filings in states that
changed their laws. By comparing states that changed their laws (a “treatment group”)
to states that made no changes (a “control group”) during the same period, I could have
greater (but not complete) confidence that any correlation between state law and bank‐
ruptcy filing rates reflects a causal relationship.86 But “better data” do not exist. For the
vast majority of states, laws regulating insolvency procedures have gone unchanged for
decades.
VI. Discussion
The results in Sections III and IV are consistent with the hypothesis that, among
small businesses, federal bankruptcy filings are the result of bargaining failure between
the business and its senior lenders. A distressed business is significantly more likely to
file for bankruptcy if it needs the consent of a bank, the IRS, or a landlord to pursue
state procedures. And it is unlikely to obtain consent if the number of senior lenders is
large, if the lenders suspect that the owner has private information about the value of
business assets, and if these procedures offer little protection against insider self‐
dealing. The choice between state and federal law, these data suggest, is a choice made
by a firm’s senior lenders.
The control exercised by senior lenders can have two important effects on the
resolution of distress in small businesses. First, it can reduce the ex post costs of finan‐
cial distress. Relative to federal law, state procedures are generally faster, generate
lower administrative costs, and impose fewer burdens on senior lenders (such as the
federal rule denying interest payments to undersecured creditors). They also offer a
simpler alternative to Chapter 11, which is frequently criticized as an overly cumber‐
some reorganization mechanism for small businesses. Senior lenders effectively sort
businesses between cheaper, less transparent state procedures and more expensive fed‐
eral procedures that offer a more rigorous audit of the business. Assuming senior debt
exceeds the value of the business assets—which is typically the case in bankruptcy—
these lenders are effectively the owners of the assets and therefore have appropriate in‐
centives to sort businesses in a way that maximizes the return. Business owners consent
to this process because they will receive nothing in bankruptcy but could receive a pay‐
off in a state proceeding. They can demand a payoff because they are always free to file
a bankruptcy petition, which will impose costs on senior lenders.
This points to a second effect of senior lender control: senior lenders and busi‐
ness owners may collude to divert value from junior creditors. With senior lender assis‐
86

This is called difference-in-difference estimation. See generally Bruce D. Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments
in Economics, 13 J. Bus. & Econ. Stat. 151 (1995).
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tance, a business may use state procedures that make it difficult to uncover prior fraud
or to determine whether the value of business assets exceeds the secured claims. The
business may be sold off at an auction with few, if any, bidders other than the previous
owner, whose bid may be financed by senior lenders and whose bid will yield no payoff
to anyone other than the senior lenders. Junior, unsecured creditors will rarely object to
this process. Their claims are too small to warrant monitoring the proceeding.87 The po‐
tential for this dynamic—collusion among senior lenders and business owners—is a
longstanding problem in state procedures.88 Indeed, precisely the same dynamic charac‐
terized equity receiverships around the turn of the 20th century89 and led to the Supreme
Court’s decision announcing the absolute priority rule.90 Ex ante, of course, this dy‐
namic will induce junior creditors to restrict or raise the price of credit.
These observations suggest several possible directions for U.S. bankruptcy pol‐
icy. At the very least, they suggest that current policy regarding small business bank‐
ruptcy is often self‐defeating. Because federal bankruptcy law competes with state pro‐
cedures, any reform to or interpretation of federal law will have two effects: it will alter
payoffs to creditors and shareholders in bankruptcy (intensive margin) and the bargain‐
ing between entrepreneurs and senior lenders over the choice between state and federal
procedures (extensive margin). Reforms that try to improve payoffs to junior creditors in
bankruptcy, at the expense of shareholders, will tend to make state procedures more
attractive to the debtor. The dynamic along the extensive margin (inducing businesses
to choose state law) will undercut the intended effect along the intensive margin (im‐
proving payoffs to junior creditors).
The 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code are a case in point. These reforms
raised the costs of small business bankruptcy by imposing heavier reporting require‐
ments,91 time constraints,92 and other burdens93 on distressed small businesses. The goal

Several lawyers reported that, if a junior creditor does object, the dispute will often be settled by means
of a payment that convinces the creditor to withdraw the objection.
88 Several (anonymous) practitioners described this dynamic. See also Benjamin Weintraub, Harris Levin,
and Eugene Sosnoff, Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors and Competitive Systems for Liquidation of Insol‐
vent Estates, 39 Cornell L. Q. 3, 4 (1953) (“The general weakness of the out‐of‐court proceeding… is its
susceptibility to abuse.”).
89 See David Skeel, Debt’s Dominion (Princeton).
90 See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. 393.
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 308 (requiring periodic reports on profitability and projected cash flow, comparisons of
actual and projected receipts and disbursements, and a statement indicating whether the debtor is in
compliance with bankruptcy and tax laws) and 1116 (obligating the debtor or trustee to submit a balance
sheet and other financial reports within seven days of filing a Chapter 11 petition). See also 28 U.S.C.
586(a)(7) (authorizing the U.S. Trustee to visit the business premise of the debtor and inspect its records).
87
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of the reforms was, it seems, to offer greater protection to junior creditors. The effect
may be just the opposite in many cases: by raising the cost of federal law, the reforms
seem to have increased the attractiveness of state procedures, which typically offer less
protection for junior creditors.
Federal preemption rules push in the opposite direction. Federal law generally
preempts conflicting state law dealing with the same subject matter. In deciding
whether conflict exists, courts assess whether the law “stands as an obstacle to the ac‐
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”94 In mak‐
ing this assessment, the Ninth Circuit recently held that state law regulating California’s
ABC procedure is in conflict with the federal Bankruptcy Code.95 California law, like the
Code, permits the assignee to bring suit against creditors, including insiders, who re‐
ceived “preferential payment” during the firm’s descent into insolvency.96 A “preferen‐
tial payment” is one that would allow the creditor to receive a greater payoff than other
creditors with the same priority in distribution.97 Suit can be brought against any insider
who received payments within one year of the date of the ABC; other creditors can be
sued if they were paid within 90 days of the assignment. This California law was, at the
time of the case, identical to the Code’s rules regulating preferential payments.98 None‐
theless, the Ninth Circuit held that the law is preempted because it conflicts with one of
the Code’s basic goals—“equitably distributing a debtor’s assets among competing
creditors.”99 Under the Code, a debtor or trustee may recover preferential payments,
subject to federal court oversight. The same oversight does not exist under state law.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e)(2) (declaring that a reorganization plan must be submitted within 300 days),
1129(e) (requiring confirmation of the plan within 45 days after submission)
93 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(n) (eliminating the automatic stay in cases involving small businesses that exited a
prior bankruptcy case, via dismissal or a confirmed reorganization plan, within two years of the current
bankruptcy case). See generally, James B. Haines, Jr. and Philip J. Hendel, No Easy Answers: Small Business
Bankruptcies After BAPCPA, 47 Boston Coll. L. Rev. 71, 72 (2005) (arguing that the bankruptcy amend‐
ments place “potentially debilitating burdens on small business debtors that embark on statutory reor‐
ganization in financial extremis.”).
94 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
95 Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2005). Since that decision, two California
Courts of Appeals have reached the opposite conclusion, thereby creating a split between state and fed‐
eral appellate courts. See Credit Managers Ass’n v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 590
(2006); Haberbush v. Charles and Dorothy Cummins Family Ltd. Partnership, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1630 (2006).
96 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 1800(b).
97 Id.
98 11 U.S.C. § 547. See also Mette H. Kurth and Theodore A. Cohen, Bankruptcy Practitioners, Get Your Guns,
25 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 32 (July/August 2006).
99 Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d at 1203.
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Assuming its decision is followed in California state courts,100 the Ninth Circuit
has eliminated an important protection for senior creditors—the power to attack insider
self‐dealing. The empirical analysis in Section III suggests that, without this power, sen‐
ior creditors will be less willing to permit ABCs. Debtors will opt for federal bankruptcy
law instead. Preemption doctrine, then, is reducing the attractiveness of state law at the
same time that Congress is increasing it.
Coherent bankruptcy policy, it seems clear, must account for the interaction be‐
tween state and federal law. It is less clear, however, whether the current state‐federal
balance is suboptimal. State law offers a menu of alternatives for distressed small busi‐
nesses—foreclosures, bulk sales, ABCs, compositions, receiverships, and other proce‐
dures. Businesses can sort themselves across these options, choosing the procedure that
maximizes the return to creditors and insiders. In this context, federal bankruptcy law
serves only one function: a law of last resort when bargaining between debtors and sen‐
ior creditors fails. There is no obvious reason why federal law is needed or well‐suited
to perform this function. If state laws offered a richer set of alternatives, including one
that offers a strong mechanism for auditing the affairs of distressed businesses, there
would be little use for federal law. And it is possible that a state mechanism would be
superior to federal law: it would be the product of local political pressure, not lobbying
at the national level, and so might be more sensitive to the conditions of local busi‐
nesses. Indeed, current federal law has long been criticized as overly cumbersome and
expensive for small businesses.101 Largely the same procedures are used in cases involv‐
ing small businesses as in those involving multi‐national corporations. Perhaps, then,
policymakers should consider relaxing federal preemption doctrine in this area. Freed
from the doctrine’s constraints, states could better regulate their insolvency procedures
and develop stronger mechanisms for auditing distressed businesses.
VII.

Conclusion

Current discussions of small business distress focus on federal bankruptcy law.
These discussions should focus on state law, which is used by around eighty percent of
failing businesses. The remaining twenty percent tends to include businesses that are
highly distressed, encumbered by secured debt and tax liens, and unable to obtain sen‐
ior creditor consent to use state procedures. Creditors withhold consent because the
debtors have mismanaged their relationships with the creditors and because state pro‐
cedures offer little protection against insider misbehavior. Federal bankruptcy filings, in
other words, reflect bargaining failure: they occur only when debtors and senior lenders
As noted in note 95, supra, two California appellate courts have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
See, e.g., Haines and Hendel, supra note 93, at 73‐74; National Bankruptcy Commission, Bankruptcy: The
Next Twenty Years 614 (1997).
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cannot reach agreement. The remaining, unanswered question is why federal law is
needed to serve this function. State law could easily provide a procedure that the par‐
ties would use only as a last resort. Federal law appears to serve this function only be‐
cause states have been discouraged—by preemption doctrine—from doing so. If states
were given freedom to regulate more actively in this area, federal bankruptcy law
would become largely irrelevant.
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Appendix
Reconsider the model in the main text. Assume the distressed business has one
senior lender and n unsecured creditors. Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde consider a
similar environment in which the IRS must decide whether to audit taxpayers. Adapt‐
ing their model to the present context,102 assume that the value of the firm’s assets is pri‐
vate information. The senior lender can only estimate the value of the firm’s assets,
which are high (ah) with probability q and low (al) with probability 1‐q. Assume that the
bank’s claim exceeds both asset values: s> ah> al.
Because the bank is uncertain about asset value, the manager can potentially
keep some of that value for herself. The bank can obtain additional information about
the value of the assets, but only by auditing the business. Two types of audits are possi‐
ble. One is available under federal bankruptcy law (“federal audit”) and generates costs
t2 to the bank and t1 to the firm itself. Another is available under state law (“state audit”)
and generates costs of t3 to the bank. A federal audit is more expensive (t1+ t2 > t3) but
yields more information about asset value. A federal audit reveals the true value of the
assets; a state audit yields only a signal v about the value of the assets. The signal can be
either high (vh) or low (vl). If the state audit yields a high signal, the probability that
business assets have high value rises to qh>q. If the signal is low, the probability of high‐
value assets falls to ql<q. A state audit, however, does not preclude a subsequent federal
bankruptcy filing. If the bank forces the business to file a federal petition after conduct‐
ing an audit under state law, the administrative costs are t4<t2 for the bank and t1 for the
firm itself. The bank’s bankruptcy costs are lower after it has conducted its own audit
because it possesses greater information about firm value.
Consider, first, the decision to audit using federal law. Assume that the differ‐
ence in potential asset value, ∆=ah – al, exceeds the transaction costs of an audit, t1+ t2.
The bank will, therefore, find it profitable to audit if it is certain that the assets are
worth ah but the manager is only reporting al. Assume in addition that the bank’s claim s
exceeds ah, meaning that the bank will not be paid in full even if the value of business
assets is high.
Let r(a) denote the asset value reported by the owner manager. If asset value is
low, the owner has no incentive to report dishonestly; she gains nothing from reporting
a higher asset value. Therefore, r(al)= al. If asset value is high, the owner may submit a
false report, r(ah)< ah, in order to keep for herself some of the difference in asset value, ah‐
al. If, however, the owner submits a false report and the bank subsequently discovers
Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum, and Louis L. Wilde, The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an In‐
teractive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J. L., Econ., & Org. 1 (1986).
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this in bankruptcy, the owner suffers a penalty equal to b. In other words, a dishonest
manager forfeits any gains from the bankruptcy process.
Let α denote the probability that the owner of a business with high asset value
falsely reports low asset value. Applying Bayes’ rule, the bank can compute the prob‐
ability that, given a report of low asset value, the business actually has high asset value:
µ(α)=qα/(qα+1‐q)

(A1)

Given this probability, the bank must decide whether to believe an owner‐managers’
report or to force the business into federal bankruptcy court. The bank will always be‐
lieve a manager who reports high asset value. Thus, the problem for the bank is to
choose a probability β of forcing a business into bankruptcy when the owner reports
low asset value. This problem is equivalent to choosing β to maximize the bank’s ex‐
pected payoff:
β [µah +(1‐µ)(al – b) ‐ t)] + (1‐β) [al ‐b‐ δt]

(A2)

where δ is the owner’s share of transaction costs avoided by using state procedures (δ
will reflect the parties’ relative bargaining power). This simplifies to
al – b +β[µ(∆+b) ‐ t] ‐ (1‐β)δt
Given the bank’s audit strategy β, the owner‐manager will choose a probability α of re‐
porting false information about asset value. Assuming risk‐neutrality, the owner’s prob‐
lem is to maximize:
α[β(0)+(1‐β)(∆ +δt+b)]+(1‐α)[βb+(1‐β)(b+δt)]

(A3)

which simplifies to
b + α[(1‐β)(∆+b)‐b]+(1‐β)δt
The bank will choose β conditional upon the owner’s choice α; the owner will choose α
conditional upon the bank’s choice β. A Nash Equilibrium consists of owner and bank
strategies such that neither party prefers a different strategy, conditional upon the other
party’s strategy.
Consider the bank’s marginal benefit from increasing the probability of forcing a
business into bankruptcy:
µ(∆+b) – (1+δ)t

(A4)
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Notice that the marginal benefit of a bankruptcy filing is independent of β, the probabil‐
ity of forcing a business into bankruptcy. This means that the bank will choose federal
bankruptcy law whenever (A3) is positive and choose state law whenever it is negative.
Thus we can define µ’ be the threshold probability such that (A3) is equal to zero:
µʹ=(1+δ)t/(∆+b)
If µ exceeds µ’, the bank will force a business into bankruptcy; otherwise it will accept
the owner‐manager’s report. Since µ(α)=qα/(qα+1‐q), we can simplify further and iden‐
tify the threshold probability of misreporting by owner‐managers, αʹ:
αʹ =[q/(1‐q)] [(1+δ)t/(∆+b‐(1+δ)t)]

(A5)

Notice that αʹ is decreasing in δt, but δt is bounded by the transaction costs saved when
state procedures are used: δt < t = t1+ t2. Thus, even if the bank pays the owner‐manager
all of the transaction costs saved by state procedures, there will still be a positive prob‐
ability that the manager will submit false reports and, therefore, a positive probability
that the bank will force the firm into bankruptcy. Note also that αʹ could exceed 1 if t1 is
sufficiently large. If this occurs, the bank never forces businesses into bankruptcy. The
bank’s strategies are therefore to set β=1 if α>αʹ and β=0 if α<αʹ. If α=αʹ, the bank can set β
equal to any value between 0 and 1.
The owner‐manager’s marginal benefit from increasing the probability α is:
(1‐β)(∆+b)‐b

(A6)

This benefit is also independent of the probability α, implying that the owner‐manager
will report assets honestly if (A5) is negative and will falsify information if it is positive.
We can therefore define a threshold level β’ that sets (A5) to zero; if β is exceeds β’, the
owner‐manager reports honestly.
β’=∆/(∆+b)

(A7)

If the bank sets m equal to zero, β’=1, which implies that the owner‐manager will al‐
ways falsify information. The owner‐manager will therefore set α=1 if β< β’ and set α=0 if
β> β’. If β= β’, she will set α to any value between 0 and 1.
Multiple equilibria are possible here. If t1 is very large, so that αʹ=1, the equilib‐
rium will consist of the owner‐manager always falsifying information (α*=1) and the
bank never forcing the business into bankruptcy (β*=0). If t1 is sufficiently low that αʹ<1,
the bank will force a business into bankruptcy only if α= αʹ. Thus, another equilibrium
consists of owner‐managers falsifying information with probability α*= αʹ and banks
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choosing federal bankruptcy with probability β*= β’. This is an equilibrium, then, in
which some distressed businesses will use state procedures while others (with probabil‐
ity β*) will use federal bankruptcy law.
This assumes that an audit is possible only in federal court. But the conclusion—
that federal bankruptcy filings will occur when owners possess private information—
does not change when we relax this assumption. If audits can be pursued under state
law, but these audits generate signals (vh or vl) not certainty about asset value, the bank
will face two decisions: (i) whether it should audit under state or federal law, and (ii) if
it does choose to audit under state law and receives signal v, whether the it should audit
again under federal law and obtain certain information about the value of business as‐
sets. Assume that the bank always audits under state law. Will it ever subsequently au‐
dit again under federal law? Because the signal generated by a state‐law audit only var‐
ies the bank’s beliefs regarding q, the analysis summarized in (A1) through (A7) is
equally applicable to this question. For each signal v ∈ {vh , vl } , with its corresponding
probability qi ∈ {qh , ql } , there exists an equilibrium in which the bank audits again in
federal court with probability β i ∈ {β h , β l } .
This equilibrium exists, of course, because state audits are inferior to federal au‐
dits. State procedures do vary in the power they give creditors to audit businesses. In
some states, businesses are required to submit financial statements to local courts; an
owner‐manager who falsifies this information will face civil or criminal sanctions. Addi‐
tionally, in some states creditors (or assignees) have power to attack insider self‐dealing
or to sue creditors who received preferential treatment. When a state offers these kinds
of regulations, it is increasing the ability of senior lenders to resolve uncertainty sur‐
rounding asset value. If state regulations enable lenders to discover the true value of
business assets, there will be no equilibrium in which lenders audit again under federal
law. And if state audits are cheaper than federal bankruptcy filings, all audits will occur
under state law. There will be no need for federal bankruptcy filings.
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Figure 1: Sample of Chicago Tribune “Auction Mart” (April 5, 1998)

46

Tables

Table 1
Auctions listed in the Chicago Tribune,
“Auction Mart,” during 1998
Total auctions
Auctions mentioning company name
Bankruptcy filings
Listings mentioning ABC
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302
254
35 (13.8%)
34 (13.4%)

State
Delaware
Nevada
Arizona
DC
New York
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Maryland
Tennessee
California
Virginia
Pennsylvania
Texas
Connecticut
Washington
Utah
Louisiana
Alaska
Rhode Island
Georgia
Florida
Alabama
Idaho
West Virginia
Mississippi
Indiana
New Hampshire

Filings per 1000 Deaths
Corporate Chapter 11
1994-2001
1990-2003
124.06
274.67
27.90
47.14
15.84
44.46
21.24
37.05
20.20
33.17
22.89
32.19
29.69
30.34
20.37
30.11
12.46
26.53
20.30
25.37
16.62
24.08
20.66
24.01
18.10
22.47
13.23
20.51
14.50
20.23
13.76
20.20
17.95
19.44
8.52
19.42
21.05
19.39
15.23
19.09
17.33
18.82
13.43
18.74
12.75
18.34
18.61
18.05
12.88
17.86
14.59
17.01
15.69
17.00
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Table 2
State Laws and Bankruptcy Filing Rates
UFTA
Adopted
UFTA
General
Court
Section 5(b)
date
preferences Oversight
1
1996
0
0
1
1987
0
0
0
1990
0
1
1
1996
0
0
0
1
1
1
1996
0
0
1
1989
1
0
0
1
1
1
2003
1
0
0
1986
1
0
0
0
0
0
1993
1
0
1
1988
1
0
1
1991
0
0
1
1988
1
1
1
1988
0
1
1
2003
0
0
0
0
0
1
1986
0
0
1
2002
0
0
1
1988
0
1
1
1990
0
0
1
1987
0
0
1
1986
0
0
0
2006
0
0
0
2002
0
0
1
1988
1
1
ABC Regulations
Creditor
Other
oversight
regulations
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1

Preferential
assignments ok
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 2, continued
State Laws and Bankruptcy Filing Rates
Filings per 1000 Deaths
UFTA
ABC Regulations
State
Corporate
Chapter 11
Adopted
UFTA
General
Court
Creditor
Other
Preferential
1994-2001
1990-2003
Section 5(b)
Date
preferences Oversight
oversight
regulations assignments ok
Michigan
15.80
16.15
1
1999
0
0
0
1
0
South Carolina
10.73
15.85
0
1
0
1
0
0
Illinois
18.55
15.53
1
1990
0
0
0
0
0
New Mexico
13.21
15.28
1
1989
0
1
0
1
0
Kentucky
15.50
14.81
0
1
1
0
1
0
Wyoming
9.19
14.73
0
2006
0
0
0
0
0
Oklahoma
13.21
14.48
1
1987
0
0
0
1
0
Hawaii
15.74
14.24
1
1985
0
0
0
0
0
Ohio
9.34
12.20
1
1991
0
1
0
1
0
Kansas
8.33
12.08
1
1999
0
0
0
0
0
Vermont
10.88
11.77
1
1996
0
0
0
1
0
Missouri
8.32
11.39
1
1993
0
1
0
1
0
Arkansas
8.11
11.23
1
1987
0
1
0
1
0
Colorado
8.78
11.19
1
1991
0
1
0
1
0
Montana
7.22
11.19
1
1991
0
0
0
1
0
North Carolina
9.76
10.38
1
1998
1
0
0
1
0
Minnesota
9.31
10.07
1
1987
0
0
0
1
0
Nebraska
7.04
10.03
1
1990
0
0
0
0
0
Wisconsin
8.38
9.67
1
1988
1
1
0
1
0
Maine
11.55
8.49
1
1986
0
0
0
0
0
South Dakota
7.38
7.97
1
1987
1
1
0
1
0
Oregon
8.00
7.56
1
1986
0
0
0
0
0
Iowa
5.52
6.23
1
1995
0
1
0
1
0
North Dakota
3.74
5.59
1
1985
0
1
0
0
1
Note: Data for “Corporate 1994-2001” are obtained from the FJC closed claim database; data for “Chapter 11 1990-2003” are obtained from PACER case
filings data. As explained in the main text, the two datasets are not strictly comparable.

Table 3
Summary of Key Hypotheses
Regarding the Attractiveness of Federal Bankruptcy Law Relative to State Law Alternatives
Type of Data Used
Hypothesis
Predicted effect
to Test Hypothesis
Number of creditors
Business has secured debt
+
Firm-level
Business has multiple senior lenders
+
Firm-level
Information Asymmetries
Relationship with bank has deteriorated
+
Firm-level
State law promotes transparency of state procedures
State-level
Priorities
Business has tax debt
Firm-level/State-Level
Business rents real estate
+
Firm-level
Shocks
Business faces pending suits and judgments
+
Firm-level
Business recently changed
+
Firm-level
Corporations v. Non-Corporations
The hypotheses listed above will matter more for corporaFirm-Level/State-Level
tions than for non-corporations
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333

329

329

329

329

25,178

49,903

1,235

1,820

407

61
(18.5%)
54
(16.2%)

51

2
(3.2%)
1
(1.9%)

14
(14.3%)
12
(15.4%)

1
(20.0%)
0
(0.0%)

11
(15.4%)
9
(17.6%)

20
(15.9%)
13
(20.0%)

(6)
Distressed Bankruptcies
(% Distressed Exits)

77
40
157
90

77
40
157
90

Bankruptcy Exits
Population

5
(1.5%)
3
(.1%)

71
(21.6%)
51
(15.5%)

126
(38.0%)
65
(19.8%)

(5)
Distressed Exits
(% Sample)

Sample

25
(15.6%)
14
(16.9%)

159
(47.8%)
82
(24.9%)
98
(29.8%)
78
(23.7%)

(4)
Bankruptcies
(%Exits)

(3)
Exits
(% Sample)

Panel B: Choice-Based Sample, Stratified by Initial Distress Level
State Exits
Sample
Population
High Distress (FSS=5)
Corporations
250
272
Non-corporations
177
177
Moderate Distress (FSS=4)
Corporations
250
533
Non-corporations
250
417

Non-corporations

Not Distressed (FSS<4)
Corporations

Non-corporations

Moderate Distress (FSS=4)
Corporations

Non-corporations

Panel A: Random Sample, Stratified by Initial Distress Level
(1)
(2)
Sample
Population
(number) (number)
High Distress (FSS=5)
Corporations
332
702

Table 4
D&B Sample 1: Businesses Active on Jan. 1, 1998, Followed Through 2004

Distressed (FSS=4 or 5)
Corporations
Non-corporations
Not Distressed (FSS<4)
Corporations
Non-corporations
1041
565

427
423
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569
459

250
250

295
256

295
256

Table 5
D&B Sample 2: Businesses That Closed During 1998-2000
State Exits
Bankruptcy Exits
Sample
Population
Sample
Population

Variable
Number of senior lenders
Any UCC filings
One UCC filing
Over one UCC filing
Any liens imposed
One bank
More than one bank
Information Asymmetries
Poor banking history
Poor banking history, 1 bank
Poor banking history, >1 bank
Age
Management tenure
Priorities
Rents
Shocks
Any suits/judgments
Changed owner, location, name
Other controls
Poor trade credit history
Manager with prior business failures

Table 6
Variable Definitions
Definition
=1 if business had any UCC filings
=1 if business had only one UCC filing
=1 if business had more than one UCC filing
=1 if any liens reported in public records
=1 if business had one bank lender
=1 if business had more than one bank lender
=1 if bank reported slow or delinquent payments
=(One bank) * (Poor banking history)
=(More than one bank) * (Poor banking history)
Firm age in years
Management tenure in years
=1 if business rents real estate
=1 if any suits or judgments were pending
=1 if business moved, changed owners or name

Business with prior failures
Years in distress

=1 if trade creditors reported slow or delinquent payments
=1 if manager owned previous businesses that filed for bankruptcy
or failed without fully paying creditors
=1 if business underwent prior bankruptcy or receivership
Number of years business was in distress

Fire, burglary, indictment
Annual sales (normalized)
Employment
Run from owner's home
Owns real estate
Woman-owned
Minority-owned
Multiple business lines
Wholesale

=1 if business suffered fire, burglary, indictment
Average annual sales divided by average industry sales
Average employment
=1 if business is run out of owner’s home
=1 if business owns real estate
=1 if owner is female
=1 if owner is member of a minority group
=1 if firm runs multiple lines of business
=1 if primary business line is wholesale
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Construction
Finance
Manufacturing
Retail
Services
Transportation
Wholesale

Age
Less than 7 years old
Annual sales
Fewer than 20 employees
0.127
0.046
0.121
0.235
0.225
0.094
0.152
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0.192
0.009
0.113
0.286
0.221
0.063
0.115

.132
.033
.099
.275
.341
.044
.022

Table 7
Comparison of D&B Data to Alternative Data Sources
Mean (Standard Error)
Northern District of
State Exits
Bankruptcy Exits
Illinois
15.591
16.296
12.6
.286
.238
.505
2,016,563
1,987,803
2,197,599
.861
.826
.831

.112
.03
.117
.188
.239
.033
.113

Survey of Small
Business Finance 1998
13.7
--.831

Bankruptcy Exits

Table 8
Summary Statistics: All Businesses
Mean (Standard Error)
Full Sample
State Exits
0.155
(0.005)

Number of senior lenders
Any UCC filings
One UCC filing
Over one UCC filing
One bank
More than one bank
Any liens
Information asymmetries
Poor banking history
Poor banking history, one bank
Poor banking history, more than one bank
Age
Management tenure
Priorities
Rents
Shocks
Any suits/judgments
Changed owner, location, name
Other controls
Poor trade credit history
Run from owner's home
Business with prior failures
Years in distress
Annual sales
Employment

Bankruptcy Exits

0.591
(39.478)
0.136
(12.567)
0.455
(30.024)
0.199
(14.866)
0.166
(13.729)
0.457
(31.747)

0.570
(33.036)
0.134
(11.188)
0.436
(25.220)
0.198
(13.035)
0.153
(11.290)
0.440
(26.998)

0.694***
(30.590)
0.143
(5.761)
0.551***
(18.917)
0.202
(7.324)
0.231***
(9.141)
0.541***
(19.229)

0.519
(45.903)
0.088
(11.244)
0.092
(11.825)
14.233
(27.297)
10.028
(33.596)

0.490
(38.033)
0.081
(9.271)
0.075
(8.896)
14.085
(24.061)
9.852
(28.732)

0.666***
(31.296)
0.126**
(7.005)
0.176***
(8.914)
14.891
(13.464)
10.810
(20.026)

0.434
(28.419)

0.418
(24.011)

0.516***
(18.320)

0.678
(48.650)
0.199
(14.966)

0.661
(41.312)
0.200
(13.331)

0.763***
(31.440)
0.190
(6.937)

0.427
(27.633)
0.067
(7.555)
0.037
(7.049)
2.2
(.05)
1,451,260
(177,509.6)
14.6

0.406
(23.333)
0.064
(6.337)
0.026
(4.874)
2.2
(.06)
1,432,157
(209,595.5)
14.7

0.530***
(15.960)
0.085
(4.643)
0.093***
(5.476)
2.1
(.08)
1,547,303**
(194,706.5)
14.3*
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Woman-owned
Minority-owned

Table 8
Summary Statistics: All Businesses
Mean (Standard Error)
Full Sample
State Exits
(1.5)
(1.81)
0.044
0.039
(5.759)
(4.619)
0.083
0.084
(8.673)
(7.597)

Industry
Construction

Bankruptcy Exits
(1.44)
0.065
(4.208)
0.081
(4.955)

0.131
0.119
0.194***
(12.755)
(10.488)
(7.739)
Finance
0.034
0.039
0.009***
(5.126)
(4.943)
(1.759)
Manufacturing
0.099
0.096
0.116
(10.430)
(9.182)
(4.933)
Retail
0.282
0.281
0.282
(18.959)
(16.615)
(10.417)
Services
0.254
0.261
0.216
(17.975)
(16.303)
(7.644)
Transportation
0.074
0.076
0.065
(9.263)
(8.294)
(4.469)
Wholesale
0.126
0.127
0.117
(10.998)
(9.669)
(6.377)
Observations
1228
930
298
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbol † indicates that the means and statistical tests for these
variables are based on a subset of the data in which these variables have non-missing values. The symbol
*** indicates that the bankruptcy-exit coefficient is different from the corresponding state-exit coefficient at
the 1% level, applying the Wald test; ** indicates difference at the 5% level; * indicates difference at the
10% level.
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Bankruptcy Exits

Table 9
Summary Statistics: Corporations
Mean (Standard Error)
Full Sample
State Exits
0.168
(0.007)

Number of senior lenders
Any UCC filings
One UCC filing
Over one UCC filing
One bank
More than one bank
Any liens
Information Asymmetries
Poor banking history
Poor banking history, one bank
Poor banking history, more than one bank
Age
Control age
Priorities
Rents
Shocks
Any suits/judgments
Changed owner, location, name
Other controls
Poor trade credit history
Run from owner's home
Business with prior failures
Years in distress

Bankruptcy Exits

0.717
(38.289)
0.127
(9.424)
0.590
(28.993)
0.242
(13.151)
0.238
(13.344)
0.573
(30.210)

0.693
(31.424)
0.127
(8.445)
0.566
(24.056)
0.243
(11.459)
0.223
(10.869)
0.564
(25.632)

0.828***
(33.486)
0.130
(4.106)
0.699***
(18.506)
0.240
(6.499)
0.309**
(9.684)
0.612
(19.461)

0.538
(39.935)
0.111
(10.205)
0.134
(11.628)
15.607
(24.038)
10.632
(29.775)

0.501
(32.109)
0.102
(8.393)
0.109
(8.624)
15.435
(21.191)
10.470
(25.264)

0.713***
(30.706)
0.150*
(6.436)
0.251***
(8.914)
16.386
(11.721)
11.343
(18.529)

0.561
(27.248)

0.543
(22.725)

0.645**
(19.822)

0.790
(46.850)
0.227
(12.915)

0.777
(39.153)
0.230
(11.426)

0.850**
(36.569)
0.214
(5.944)

0.537
(25.810)
0.058
(5.205)
0.045
(6.620)
2.3
(.07)

0.519
(21.575)
0.059
(4.506)
0.029
(4.415)
2.3
(.08)

0.627**
(15.491)
0.053
(3.546)
0.120***
(5.177)
2.2
(.09)
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Annual sales
Employment
Woman-owned
Minority-owned

Table 9
Summary Statistics: Corporations
Mean (Standard Error)
Full Sample
State Exits

Bankruptcy Exits

2,003,495
(268,647.6)
19.3
(2.30)
0.024
(3.368)
0.089
(6.991)

2,094,592
(270,774.4)
18.6
(2.04)
0.031
(2.354)
0.093
(4.407)

Industry
Construction

1,984,136
(320,621.2)
19.4
(2.75)
0.022
(2.744)
0.087
(5.903)

0.140
0.128
0.195**
(10.622)
(8.583)
(6.989)
Finance
0.037
0.044
0.004***
(3.970)
(3.905)
(1.000)
Manufacturing
0.126
0.120
0.152
(9.463)
(8.218)
(4.659)
Retail
0.240
0.245
0.217
(12.959)
(11.387)
(7.508)
Services
0.215
0.218
0.203
(12.337)
(10.922)
(5.675)
Transportation
0.088
0.091
0.075
(7.955)
(7.076)
(3.979)
Wholesale
0.154
0.154
0.154
(9.804)
(8.425)
(6.218)
Observations
774
564
209
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbol † indicates that the means and statistical tests for these variables are based on a subset of the data in which these variables have non-missing values. The symbol *** indicates that the bankruptcy-exit coefficient is different from the corresponding state-exit coefficient at the 1%
level, applying the Wald test; ** indicates difference at the 5% level; * indicates difference at the 10% level.
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Table 10
Odds of Federal Bankruptcy Filing
(1)
(2)
(3)
Distressed
Distressed
Distressed NonCorporations
Corporations
Corporations
Number of senior lenders
Any UCC filings
Any liens
Information asymmetries
Poor banking history
Management tenure
Priorities
Rents
Shocks
Any suits/judgments
Changed owner, location, name
Other controls
Poor trade credit history
Exit year
Business with prior failures
Years in distress
Annual sales
Employment

(4)
Highly Distressed
Corporations

2.375***
[0.001]
<0.114***>
1.474*
[0.070]
<0.056*>

2.357***
[0.001]
<0.113***>
1.500*
[0.059]
<0.059*>

1.648
[0.173]
<0.071>
1.933
[0.134]
<0.098>

3.638***
[0.002]
<0.152***>
2.395***
[0.004]
<0.117***>

2.557***
[0.000]
<0.129***>
0.775
[0.114]
<-0.038>

2.596***
[0.000]
<0.131***>
0.804
[0.171]
<-0.032>

2.688**
[0.011]
<0.140***>
1.144
[0.585]
<0.019>

1.989**
[0.043]
<0.092**>
1.031
[0.898]
<0.004>

1.332
[0.160]
<0.042>

1.392
[0.103]
<0.048*>

1.008
[0.984]
<0.001>

1.046
[0.878]
<0.006>

0.759
[0.259]
<-0.039>

1.495
[0.323]
<0.055>
0.884
[0.785]
<-0.017>

1.092
[0.880]
<0.012>
0.403***
[0.003]
<-0.117***>

1.189**
[0.010]
<0.025**>
4.021***
[0.000]
<0.262***>
0.729**
[0.042]
<-0.046**>
1.027
[0.854]
<0.004>
0.905
[0.541]
<-0.015>

1.074
[0.873]
<0.010>
0.903
[0.494]
<-0.014>
0.454
[0.556]
<-0.090>
0.793
[0.200]
<-0.033>
1.017
[0.954]
<0.002>
0.739
[0.387]
<-0.042>

1.825*
[0.098]
<0.078*>
1.371***
[0.008]
<0.044***>
4.604***
[0.001]
<0.267***>
0.428***
[0.001]
<-0.117***>
0.995
[0.981]
<-0.001>
1.007
[0.975]
<0.001>

1.492
[0.149]
<0.055>
0.742
[0.222]
<-0.042>
1.201
[0.392]
<0.027>
1.197***
[0.007]
<0.026***>
4.220***
[0.000]
<0.271***>
0.687**
[0.015]
<-0.055**>
1.000
[0.998]
<-0.000>
0.916
[0.588]
<-0.013>

59

Run from owner’s home
Woman-owned
Minority-owned

Table 10
Odds of Federal Bankruptcy Filing
(1)
(2)
(3)
Distressed
Distressed
Distressed NonCorporations
Corporations
Corporations
2.264
[0.102]
<0.133>
2.231
2.127
2.114*
[0.110]
[0.123]
[0.065]
<0.118>
<0.111>
<0.105*>
1.084
1.074
0.616
[0.805]
[0.827]
[0.372]
<0.012>
<0.011>
<-0.062>

Industry
Finance

(4)
Highly Distressed
Corporations

0.621
[0.778]
<-0.066>
1.188
[0.697]
<0.025>

0.118**
0.112**
0.455
[0.042]
[0.038]
[0.370]
<-0.177***>
<-0.178***>
<-0.091>
Manufacturing
0.621
0.617
0.464
0.398*
[0.179]
[0.174]
[0.342]
[0.072]
<-0.064>
<-0.065>
<-0.090>
<-0.111**>
Retail
0.567*
0.533**
1.188
0.473
[0.063]
[0.038]
[0.742]
[0.122]
<-0.077**>
<-0.085**>
<0.024>
<-0.094*>
Services
0.536*
0.547*
0.483
0.535
[0.062]
[0.070]
[0.179]
[0.188]
<-0.083**>
<-0.081**>
<-0.095>
<-0.079>
Transportation
0.389**
0.374**
0.933
0.285**
[0.016]
[0.013]
[0.931]
[0.018]
<-0.114***>
<-0.117***>
<-0.009>
<-0.141***>
Wholesale
0.515**
0.522**
0.358
0.476*
[0.041]
[0.044]
[0.242]
[0.092]
<-0.087**>
<-0.085**>
<-0.112>
<-0.092*>
Observations
714
714
283
377
Notes: Robust p-values in square brackets; average marginal effects in triangular brackets. The symbols ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The symbols ++ and -- indicate that the variable was
dropped from the analysis because it was perfectly positively (++) or negatively (--) correlated with the dependant
variable.
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Table 11
Odds of Exit
(1)
(2)
Bankruptcy Exits Bankruptcy Exits
v. State Exits
v. State Exits
Distressed
Distressed
Corps.
Non-Corps.
Number of senior lenders
One senior lender

(3)
Bankruptcy Exits
v. State Exits
Highly Distressed
Corps.

(4)
Distressed Exits
v. Healthy Exits
Healthy & Distressed Corps.

2.395**
[0.022]

1.977
[0.116]

3.210**
[0.023]

2.377**
[0.049]

2.294***
[0.002]

1.313
[0.532]

3.513***
[0.005]

3.895***
[0.000]

1.522*
[0.058]

2.039*
[0.079]

2.357***
[0.004]

9.876***
[0.000]

1.890*
[0.095]

1.926
[0.162]

0.968
[0.972]

+
+

2.797***
[0.000]

3.549***
[0.003]

2.212**
[0.018]

+
+

0.776
[0.108]

1.117
[0.656]

1.057
[0.822]

0.217***
[0.000]

1.331
[0.159]

0.958
[0.923]

1.012
[0.967]

2.148**
[0.023]

1.500
[0.147]

1.422
[0.371]

1.354
[0.607]

4.081***
[0.002]

0.734
[0.210]

0.901
[0.816]

0.392***
[0.003]

0.584
[0.195]

1.187***
[0.010]

0.896
[0.459]

1.343**
[0.012]

+
+

Business with prior failures

4.075***
[0.000]

0.469
[0.590]

4.088***
[0.002]

33.408***
[0.000]

Years in distress

0.693**
[0.013]

0.812
[0.245]

0.442***
[0.002]

Annual sales

0.995
[0.971]

0.995
[0.986]

0.978
[0.909]

More than one senior lender
Any liens
Information asymmetries
Poor banking history, 1 report
Poor banking history, >1 report
Management tenure
Priorities
Rents
Shocks
Any suits/judgments
Changed owner, location, name
Other controls
Exit year
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0.819
[0.320]

Table 11
Odds of Exit
(1)
(2)
Bankruptcy Exits Bankruptcy Exits
v. State Exits
v. State Exits
Distressed
Distressed
Corps.
Non-Corps.
Employment

0.920
[0.602]

0.774
[0.470]

Run from owner's home
Woman-owned

(3)
Bankruptcy Exits
v. State Exits
Highly Distressed
Corps.

(4)
Distressed Exits
v. Healthy Exits
Healthy & Distressed Corps.

1.047
[0.831]

1.209
[0.419]

0.513
[0.668]

8.021
[0.120]

2.262
[0.108]
2.216
[0.124]

2.103*
[0.082]

Minority-owned

1.057
0.607
1.170
0.945
[0.868]
[0.367]
[0.723]
[0.918]
Observations
714
283
377
522
Industry Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Notes: Robust p-values in square brackets; average marginal effects in triangular brackets. The symbols ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The symbols ++ and -- indicate that the variable
was dropped from the analysis because it was perfectly positively (++) or negatively (--) correlated with the dependant variable.
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Variable
Bankruptcy Cases,
Annual Filings
Bankruptcy Cases,
Closed Cases
Business Deaths
Number of firms
Employment
Insolvency laws
Population

Population Density
Urban Population
Tax Liens

Region-4
Region-9

Table 12
State-Level Data Sources
Source
PACER Bankruptcy Statistics, Statistical Reports, Table F-2,
http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov/
Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base Bankruptcy Petitions, 19942003, Study Nos. 4303-4306, 4086, 4088, 4249-4252,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, Dynamic Data—
Births, Deaths, Growth, and Decline—State Major Industry Data, 19891998, 1998-2003, http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html
same
same
Lexis-Nexis; Westlaw
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates,
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/st8090ts.txt;
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/ST-99-03.txt;
http://www.census.gov/popest/datasets.html
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. GCT-PH1. Population, Housing
Units, Area, and Density: 2000.
U.S. Census Bureau, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, Table A-2,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/
smadb/SMADBstate.html
Lexis-Nexis, Tax Liens Library (Public Records, Judgments & Liens,
Tax Liens) (search term: "federal tax lien" and 1998 and (corporation or
corp or inc or incorp or incorporated or llc or pc or limited or ltd or lc)
AND NOT release)
Census regions (1=Northeast, 2=Midwest, 3=South, 4=West);
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/rg_metadata.html
Census divisions (1=New England, 2=Middle Atlantic, 3=East North
Central, 4=West North Central, 5=South Atlantic, 6=East South Central,
7=West South Central, 8=Mountain, 9=Pacific)
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Table 13
Means and Pairwise Correlations
(significance at the 5% level is indicated by a *)
Pairwise Correlations
I
II
III
IV
Variable
Corp. Filing
Bus. Ch. 11 All Bus. Filing
(all continuous variables are logged)
Means
Rate
Filing Rate
Rate
BankruptcyRate
Corp. Filing Rate
2.35
1.0000
Bus. Ch. 11 Filing Rate
2.57
0.4946*
1.0000
All Bus. Filing Rate
4.24
0.2667*
0.4837*
1.0000
Information Production and Creditor Protection
General Preferences
.28
0.0807
0.0667
-0.0474
Insider Preferences
.38
-0.1345*
-0.2795*
-0.0383
Court Oversight
.34
-0.1506*
-0.1346*
0.0360
Creditor Oversight
.04
0.0106
-0.0157
-0.1220*
Other Regulations
.62
0.0380
0.0831*
0.0861*
Pref. Assignments OK
.04
-0.1148*
-0.1332*
0.0831*
Information Production and Creditor Protection
High Tax Liens (=1 if > median)
.73
0.0071
0.1811*
-0.0656
Controls
Firm Growth Rate
-4.44
0.1751*
0.2561*
0.3127*
Employment Growth Rate
12.02
-0.1146*
-0.2698*
-0.1283*
Average Case Length
.17
0.6191*
0.2841*
0.3530*
Consumer Filing Rate
.86
-0.0409
-0.1090*
-0.1325*
Urban population
4.25
0.2376*
0.3495*
-0.0392
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Table 13
Means and Pairwise Correlations, continued
(significance at the 5% level is indicated by a *)
Pairwise Correlations
V
VI
VII
VIII
Variable
General
Insider
Court
Creditor
(all continuous variables are logged)
Preferences Preferences
Oversight
Oversight
Information Production and Creditor Protection
General Preferences
1.0000
Insider Preferences
-0.1315*
1.0000
Court Oversight
0.2175*
0.0916*
1.0000
Creditor Oversight
0.1021*
-0.0151
-0.1429*
1.0000
Other Regulations
0.2922*
0.0370
0.4588*
-0.0533
Pref. Assignments OK
-0.1243*
0.1303*
0.2857*
-0.0408
Information Production and Creditor Protection
High Tax Liens (=1 if > median)
-0.0280
-0.2642*
-0.1355*
-0.1143*
Controls
Firm Growth Rate
-0.1089*
-0.0236
-0.0040
0.0023
Employment Growth Rate
0.2282*
0.0165
0.1348*
-0.0670
Urban population
0.0453
-0.0232
0.0276
-0.2594*
Average Case Length
0.0131
-0.1006*
0.0038
-0.0002
Consumer Filing Rate
-0.0519
0.3984*
0.0017
-0.0832*

X
Pref.
Assignments OK

1.0000
-0.0584*
0.0309
-0.1128*
-0.0040
0.0137
-0.0037

IX
Other
Regulations

1.0000
-0.0533
-0.0688*
-0.0116
0.1130*
-0.0511
0.0175
-0.0046
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Table 14
PACER Case Filings Data: Bankruptcy Filings per 1000 Business Deaths
(1)
(2)
(3)
Business Chapter 11
Business Chapter 11
Business Chapter 7
General Preference
0.054
0.013
0.060
[0.535]
[0.894]
[0.644]
Insider Preferences
-0.245***
-0.258***
0.042
[0.006]
[0.003]
[0.700]
Court Oversight
-0.052
-0.062
0.094
[0.577]
[0.507]
[0.445]
Creditor Oversight
0.294
[0.362]
Other Regulations
0.100
[0.330]
Pref. Assignments OK
-0.161
[0.192]
Consumer Filing Rate
0.358***
0.379***
0.266*
[0.002]
[0.003]
[0.082]
Small Firm Growth Rate
-0.007
0.276
-0.256
[0.998]
[0.933]
[0.947]
High Tax Liens
0.016
0.041
0.032
[0.773]
[0.430]
[0.718]
Urban Population
0.967***
1.009***
-0.671***
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.005]
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Region dummies
4 regions
4 regions
4 regions
Observations
582
582
582
R-squared
0.690
0.700
0.315
Note: Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 15
FJC Closed Case Data: Corporate Bankruptcy Filings per 1000 Business Deaths
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
All
All
Corporate
Corporate
Corporate
Corporate
Chapter 7
Chapter 11
General Preference
0.074
0.024
0.125
0.012
[0.297]
[0.746]
[0.147]
[0.909]
Insider Preferences
-0.059
-0.079
0.017
-0.190**
[0.440]
[0.279]
[0.862]
[0.024]
Court Oversight
-0.158*
-0.163*
-0.195*
-0.105
[0.058]
[0.051]
[0.057]
[0.296]
Average Case Length
0.092
0.072
-0.129
0.455**
[0.594]
[0.647]
[0.534]
[0.018]
Consumer Filing Rate
0.009
0.025
0.030
-0.043
[0.866]
[0.653]
[0.600]
[0.519]
Small Firm Growth Rate
-0.706
0.079
-0.900
-0.714
[0.863]
[0.984]
[0.822]
[0.894]
Creditor Oversight
0.295
[0.353]
Other Regulations
0.111
[0.266]
Pref. Assignments OK
-0.253
[0.270]
High Tax Liens
0.083
0.116**
0.112*
0.056
[0.132]
[0.032]
[0.084]
[0.378]
Urban Population
0.971***
1.032***
0.865***
1.149***
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Region dummies
4 regions
4 regions
4 regions
4 regions
Observations
367
367
367
367
R-squared
0.629
0.652
0.477
0.623
Note: Robust p values in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

-0.004
[0.914]
0.350***
[0.000]
Yes
4 regions
367
0.917

(6)
All
Business
0.076*
[0.093]
0.026
[0.522]
-0.084*
[0.066]
0.073
[0.388]
0.654***
[0.000]
0.409
[0.801]

